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Both the United States and the European Union support the promotion of 
international justice yet disagree over the utility of the International Criminal Court.  The 
controversy that the Court has generated among members of the long-standing trans-
Atlantic partnership is indicative of deeper differences between the United States and EU 
members and it has the potential to threaten alliance cohesion.  This thesis examines 
American policy toward the Court and its foundations, as well as the actions taken since 
the May 2002 withdrawal of the U.S. signature to the Rome Statute establishing the ICC.  
It then reviews EU policies toward the Court and their foundations, focusing on reactions 
to American policies and to the controversy associated with U.S. actions since the May 
2002 withdrawal.  The thesis analyzes the dispute between the United States and the EU 
over the ICC, focusing on the disparity in power, the roles of sovereignty and the UN 
Security Council, disagreements over means of achieving agreed ends in international 
law, the dispute’s politicized nature, and the degree to which both sides seem to be 
“talking past one another.”  Finally, the thesis evaluates scenarios for the Court’s 
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This thesis addresses competing American and European Union perceptions and 
policies toward the International Criminal Court.  It examines the foundations of 
American and European views, analyzes what the differences in these views indicate 
about the current status of European-American relations, and evaluates the implications 
of diverging opinion for the future of the Euro-Atlantic relationship. 
The International Criminal Court, and the controversy it has raised between the 
United States and its European Union partners, is an important issue with ramifications 
for the future of international law and Euro-Atlantic partnership.  As the European Union 
expands its membership and gains increased supranational legal, political, and economic 
responsibilities, the split in European and American views could increase the likelihood 
of European-American divisions on critical foreign policy matters.  Additionally, the 
diverging views on each side of the Atlantic could make multi-lateral consensus for 
military and humanitarian intervention more difficult to obtain.  When the ICC hears its 
first case against an indicted criminal, the outcome may have significant implications, 
whether positive or negative, for both the Court’s supporters and detractors.  In addition 
to political ramifications, the Court’s first case will set important precedents in 
international law and may call into question the practice of establishing ad hoc criminal 
tribunals for those accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  In short, the 
International Criminal Court, given the strong views it has elicited on both sides of the 
Atlantic, symbolizes a growing rift in trans-Atlantic relations that will challenge 
European and American leaders alike. 
 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This thesis seeks to answer the following major research question: What does the 
controversy between the United States and European Union governments over the 
International Criminal Court indicate about the respective strategic cultures of each side 
and the future of the transatlantic relationship?  In order to answer this question and 
evaluate why the policies of the United States and European Union governments have 
2 
caused such controversy, this thesis also investigates these subsidiary questions: What are 
the policies of the United States and the European Union toward the Court and what are 
their respective foundations?  What are the merits of American reservations about the 
Court and European responses to them, and how has this dispute developed?  What are 
the likely implications of this dispute for the future of the International Criminal Court 
and the transatlantic relationship? Finally, what can be done by both sides to alleviate 
tensions and resolve contentious issues between them? 
In investigating these research questions, this thesis makes the following 
preliminary observations.  It appears that the United States and the European Union agree 
on the principles embodied by the Rome Statute but disagree on the Court itself due to 
diverging strategic cultures and national traditions.  Furthermore, official U.S. opposition 
to the Court evidently stems from American constitutional and legal traditions, whereas 
support for the Court among members of the European Union is a product of Europe’s 
unique tradition of transnational legal and political institutions.  The thesis investigates 
the hypothesis that the ICC has become a symbolic and politicized issue used for political 
leverage by both sides, and that both agree on the ends sought in international law but 
differ on the appropriate means of achieving them.  The thesis assesses the risk that the 
controversy over the ICC and lack of American involvement could threaten the Court in 
its early stages or damage a currently fragile Euro-Atlantic partnership.  
This thesis examines the official policies of the United States and European Union 
governments and their foundations in domestic policies and international legal traditions. 
It initially addresses U.S. perceptions of the Court.  It analyzes the specific American 
reservations about the Court and stated reasons for the withdrawal of signatory status on 
6 May 20021.  The U.S. policy on the Court can be traced to American legal and 
constitutional traditions.  The thesis then focuses on European perceptions of the ICC. 
The strong European support for the Court has its foundations in the emerging tradition 
of the European Union’s trans-national legal and governmental institutions. 
The next element of the thesis consists of an analysis of what the differences in 
views of the Court indicate about the current status of trans-Atlantic relations.  It 
                                                 
1 “United States of America.” [http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/theamericas/unitedstates.html]. 
Accessed 16 December 2002. 
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evaluates the extent to which these differing interpretations signify divergent European 
and American views and increase the likelihood of future diplomatic and political 
disagreements in trans-Atlantic relations.  This section of the thesis examines the political 
and symbolic nature of the dispute over the Court, and the resulting characterization of 
American and European policies as unilateralist and multilateralist, respectively.  The 
thesis then addresses the implications of this disagreement for the future of transatlantic 
relations and European and American responses to international events and crises.  This 
section discusses the importance of the growing rift between America and Europe in the 
context of the debate over military intervention in and reconstruction of Iraq and 
continuing peacekeeping commitments in the Balkans, and with regard to future 
multilateral military and humanitarian interventions.  The thesis concludes with the 
recommendation that United States policymakers evaluate the political and diplomatic 
costs of America’s withdrawal of its signature to the treaty establishing the Court in light 
of the current divergence in opinion between the United States and Europe and weigh the 
benefits of adhering to the Rome Statute. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
 
The controversy surrounding the International Criminal Court can be analyzed 
and interpreted by various methods.  The first interpretation emphasizes elements of 
international law and the cultural, legal, and political backgrounds from which one views 
the nascent Court.  This perspective focuses on whether the Court, as constituted in the 
1998 Rome Statute, can be a viable legal institution for prosecution of the world’s worst 
crimes.  However, a strict reading of the text of the Rome treaty alone is insufficient to 
evaluate the Court’s potential effectiveness and implications.  The cultural, legal, and 
political backgrounds from which one views the Court are instrumental in understanding 
a government’s policies toward the ICC. 
Furthermore, this dispute can be interpreted not only as a disagreement over the 
specific provisions of the Court but also as a more general disagreement about the 
effectiveness and reliability of legal institutions with broad jurisdiction and wide-ranging 
powers.  The latter, broader disagreement amounts to a dispute over the advisability of 
states transferring legal and political sovereignty to international institutions and regimes. 
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The essence of this disagreement is visible in the debates within American society 
between those who view the subordination of national sovereignty to the International 
Criminal Court in certain instances as critical to upholding the tenets of international law 
and those who fear that any subordination of American sovereignty to the Court will 
damage American foreign policy and endanger American citizens. 
An additional interpretation of the Court presents it as a symbolic issue or a 
“political football” tossed back and forth between its supporters and detractors.  In this 
manner, the Court is often viewed as one in a long list of disputed international treaties 
and agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change2 or the Ottawa Landmine Treaty (Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti Personnel Mines and 
on Their Destruction).3  Consequently, general conclusions about a particular state’s 
policies regarding international law and supranational institutions have been drawn based 
on that state’s acceptance or rejection of the Court.  The United States and the European 
Union have also used the Court as a means of pressuring aspirant members of NATO and 
the European Union to either reject the Court, in the case of the United States and NATO 
membership, or support the Court, in the case of the European Union and EU 
membership.4 
This thesis combines elements of these interpretations, examining the legal 
arguments for and against the Court, investigating the foundations of European and 
American perceptions, and evaluating the extent to which the Court has become a 
politicized issue and what impact this development may have on future trans-Atlantic 
relations. 
It relies heavily on official United States and European Union government 
sources for documents, legislation, and proclamations.   It investigates available material 
from international non-governmental organizations involved with the Court and 
                                                 
2 “The Kyoto protocol- A brief summary.” [http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/kyoto.htm]. 
Accessed 11 March 2003. 
3 “Arms Control Today- The Ottawa Landmine Treaty: Analysis and Text.” 
[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_09/apltreat.asp].  Accessed 7 February 2003. 
4 “The International Criminal Court: Choose your club, America says: Central Europe torn between the EU 
and the United States,” The Economist, 24 August, 2002, 42.-   This article discusses how the ICC is being 
used as a means of pressuring aspirant members of international organizations. 
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international law.  The thesis also evaluates general sources on U.S., European, and U.S.-
European policy matters as well as the theoretical and historical foundations of current 




Chapter II addresses the United States position on the ICC.  It outlines the specific 
American reservations about the role of the ICC’s prosecutor, protections for American 
service members, and the Court’s intended universal jurisdiction.  This chapter also 
investigates the foundations of United States policy in American constitutional and legal 
tradition. This section is fundamental to the analysis of the thesis as it provides a 
foundation for explaining the disputes between the United States and the European Union 
and the controversy caused by the Court. 
Chapter III addresses the European Union position on the ICC.  It examines the 
strong support in Europe for the Court, the sources thereof in the historical European 
adherence to multilateral international treaties, and case studies of British, French and 
German policies on the Court.  Additionally, it investigates the emerging constitutional 
framework in the European Union and existing international legal structures in the EU 
with respect to support for the ICC.    This chapter is critical to the analysis because it 
outlines how the European Union’s policy toward the Court differs from that of the 
United States, thus introducing the foundations of controversy over the Court. 
Chapter IV examines the divergence in European and American views of the 
Court.  This chapter focuses on the nature of the dispute between the two sides and how 
the issue of the ICC has assumed meaning beyond that of an international legal institution 
for both sides.  It examines the symbolic nature of the ICC and the resulting 
characterization of American policies as unilateralist and European policies as 
multilateralist, as well as the degree to which the Court has become a politicized issue 
and has been used as a political “weapon” in negotiations with European countries 
aspiring to join the European Union and NATO.  This section is critical to the thesis 
because it outlines why the Court has assumed an important role in U.S.-European 
relations and why, due to the nature of the dispute between the United States and the 
6 
European Union, this controversy could have lasting implications for the success of the 
ICC as well as transatlantic relations. 
Chapter V examines the implications of the current controversy for the ICC and 
transatlantic relations in the future.  This chapter evaluates how the controversy might 
influence the ICC in its early stages of development as well as how it might interact with 
existing and future ad hoc war crimes tribunals.  In addition, it examines the impact of the 
current controversy on the future of U.S.-European relations within the context of the 
diplomatic repercussions of the military intervention in Iraq and in an era of increasing 
international military and humanitarian commitments.  This chapter is important because 
it sets the stage for the recommendations that are provided with a view to ensuring that 
the current controversy does not significantly de-stabilize U.S.-European relations. 
The concluding chapter of the thesis reviews the major areas of analysis and 
arguments presented in the preceding chapters, including findings about the nature of the 
dispute over the ICC and provides recommendations.   This chapter is designed not only 
to synthesize the conclusions readied in the thesis, but also to provide recommendations 
for future policy and to stimulate interest in further research regarding the Court and its 























II- THE U.S. POSITION ON THE ICC: ANALYSIS AND 
EVALUATION 
A. U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE ICC 
 
The United States played a leading role in the conception and establishment of  
many norms of international justice after the Second World War.  A leading proponent of 
the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the United States was also 
instrumental in writing the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,5 the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide,6 the United Nations Security Council resolutions establishing the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,7 and the 1998 Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.8  These efforts, though varying in successful 
operation and even support from the United States following their creation, nonetheless 
reflect a desire to protect human rights, deter atrocities and crimes against humanity, and 
punish their perpetrators.  The terrible atrocities of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda galvanized international support for ad hoc war crimes tribunals for both, 
and helped to gain support for the evolving concept of a permanent international criminal 
court.  The United States played an influential role in supporting the concept of such a 
court,9 and in December 2000 President Clinton signed the resulting 1998 Rome Statute, 
albeit with reservations.  In President Clinton’s words: 
In signing, however, we are not abandoning our concerns about significant 
flaws in the treaty.  In particular, we are concerned that when the court 
comes into existence, it will not only exercise authority over personnel of 
states that have ratified the treaty, but also claim jurisdiction over 
                                                 
5 Brian Urquhart, “Mrs. Roosevelt’s Revolution,” The New York Review of Books (26 April 2001). 
6 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 
2002), 62-63. 
7 Kenneth Roth, “The Court the U.S. Doesn’t Want,” The New York Review of Books (19 November 1998): 
45. 
8 The founding role of the United States in these institutions should not be discounted, although its support 
for them has in practice been uneven.  The United States participated in the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court that produced the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998 in Rome. 
9 John R. Bolton, “Courting Danger: What’s Wrong With the International Criminal Court,” The National 
Interest (Winter 1998/99): 61. 
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personnel of states that have not.  With signature, however, we will be in a 
position to influence the evolution of the court.  Without signature, we will 
not.  Signature will enhance our ability to further protect US officials from 
unfounded charges and to achieve the human rights and accountability 
objectives of the ICC.  I will not, and do not recommend that my successor 
submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our 
fundamental concerns are satisfied.10  
 
The reservations of President Clinton and other U.S. government and military 
leaders played a critical role in the development of America’s policy toward the ICC. 
The United States formally withdrew its signature from the 1998 Rome Statute on 
the International Criminal Court, having never ratified it, because of perceived 
shortcomings of the proposed Court.  In May 2002 U.S. Under Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton wrote as follows to U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan: 
This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statue of the 
International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United 
States does not intend to become a party to the treaty.  Accordingly, the 
United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on 
December 31, 2000.  The United States requests that its intention not to 
become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the depositary’s 
status lists relating to this treaty.11  
 
The current American policy toward the Court was succinctly stated in the 
September 2002 National Security Strategy: 
We will take actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global 
security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the 
potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans 
and which we do not accept…We will implement fully the American 
                                                 
10 “Statement by US President Bill Clinton, authorizing the US signing of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: 31 December 2000: Camp David, Maryland, United States.” 
[http://www/iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/USClintonSigning21Dec00.doc].  
Accessed 16 December 2002. 
11 “U.S. Department of State: Press Statement: Richard Boucher, Spokesman- Washington, DC- May 6, 
2002- International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.”  
[http://www.state.gove/r/pa/prs/2002/9968.htm]. Accessed 14 May 2003. 
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Servicemembers Protection Act, whose provisions are intended to ensure 
and enhance the protection of U.S. personnel and officials.12 
Though the United States supported the general aims of the Court, it withdrew its 
signature from the Rome Statute due to various reservations, including the potential 
abuse of the prosecutor’s powers and the Court’s high level of autonomy from the UN 
Security Council. 
 
B. OBJECTIONS THAT PRECIPITATED WITHDRAWAL 
 
Primary American concerns included immunity for United States peacekeepers 
and soldiers from prosecution,13 the role of the independent prosecutor, and fears of the 
Court being used in politically-motivated circumstances against American personnel or 
high-ranking officials. The United States also expressed concern about the ICC’s 
intended universal jurisdiction and the risk that it would usurp the authority of the United 
Nations Security Council.   
Of critical concern was the risk that the ICC would be used to prosecute American 
soldiers for actions committed during United Nations peacekeeping operations.  In a 
speech in September 2002 John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security, outlined President Bush’s position on the ICC vis-à-vis 
American peacekeepers: 
As President Bush said, “The United States cooperates with many other 
nations to keep the peace, but we will not submit American troops to 
prosecutors and judges whose jurisdiction we do not accept… Every 
person who serves under the American flag will answer to his or her own 
superiors and to military law, not to the rulings of an unaccountable 
International Criminal Court.”14   
 
                                                 
12 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 
September 2002), p. 31. 
13 Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 
2002), 491: “…the United States opposed the creation of the ICC on the grounds that rogue prosecutors 
would use it to harass U.S. soldiers.” 
14 “The United States and the International Criminal Court: John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms 
Control and International Security: Remarks at the Aspen Institute- Berlin, Germany- September 16, 2002.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/USBolton_Aspen16Sept02.doc].  
Accessed 16 December 2002. 
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The United States has taken active measures, which are examined later in this 
chapter, to ensure that its soldiers are protected from the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Another key American concern has been the role of the independent prosecutor, 
who will have wide-ranging authority that the United States fears will be unlimited and 
unsupervised.  The United States objects to the power of the prosecutor as articulated in 
Article 42(1) of the Rome Statute: 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of 
the Court.  It shall be responsible for receiving referrals and any 
substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions 
before the Court.  A member of the Office shall not seek or act on 
instructions from any external source.15 
 
In remarks in September 2002 John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, discussed American concerns about the prosecutor: 
We are considering, in the Prosecutor, a powerful and necessary element 
of executive power, the power of law-enforcement.  Never before has the 
United States been asked to place any of that power outside the complete 
control of our national government without our consent…In the ICC’s 
central structures, the Court and Prosecutor, these sorts of political checks 
[i.e., checks and balances as in the separation of powers in the U.S. system 
of government specified in the Constitution] are either greatly attenuated 
or entirely absent.  They are effectively accountable to no one.  The 
Prosecutor will answer to no superior executive power, elected or 
unelected.16 
 
Bolton continued his comments on the ICC’s prosecutor: “Unfortunately, the 
United States has had considerable experience in the past two decades with domestic 
‘independent counsels,’ and that history argues overwhelmingly against international 
repetition.  Simply launching massive criminal investigations has an enormous political 
impact.”17  
                                                 
15 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” [http://www.iccnow.org/html/icc19990712.html].  
Accessed 16 October 2000. 
16 “The United States and the International Criminal Court: John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms 
Control and International Security: Remarks at the Aspen Institute- Berlin, Germany- September 16, 2002.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/USBolton_Aspen16Sept02.doc].  
Accessed 16 December 2002. 
17 Ibid. 
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The United States also fears that the ICC would be used against its citizens 
primarily for political purposes, or that it would bring a senior American official to trial.  
John Bolton addressed this fear in a speech in September 2002: 
A fair reading of the treaty leaves one unable to answer with confidence 
whether the United States would now be accused of war crimes for 
legitimate but controversial uses of force to protect world peace.  No U.S. 
President or his advisors could be assured that he or she would be 
unequivocally safe from the charges of criminal liability.18 
 
This concern stems from Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute, which reads in part: 
“This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity.  In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of 
a Government of parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in 
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute.”19 
Perhaps the most threatening aspect of the Court, however, is its claim of 
universal jurisdiction whenever national judicial bodies fail to act.  Proponents of the 
Court have been unsuccessful in persuading the United States of the safeguards that 
would limit the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction.  David J. Scheffer, then Ambassador at 
Large for War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic 
Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court, told the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate in July 1998: 
Thus, the treaty purports to establish an arrangement whereby U.S. armed 
forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the 
international court even if the United States has not agreed to be bound by 
the treaty…Our position is clear: Official actions of a non-party state 
should not be subject to the court’s jurisdiction if that country does not 
join the treaty, except by means of Security Council action under the U.N. 
Charter.  Otherwise, the ratification procedure would be meaningless for 
governments.  In fact, under such a theory, two governments could join 
                                                 
18 “The United States and the International Criminal Court: John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms 
Control and International Security: Remarks at the Aspen Institute- Berlin, Germany- September 16, 2002.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/USBolton_Aspen16Sept02.doc].  
Accessed 16 December 2002. 
19 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” [http://www.iccnow.org/html/icc19990712.html].  
Accessed 16 October 2000. 
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together to create a criminal court and purport to extend its jurisdiction 
over everyone, everywhere in the world.20  
 
Though the ICC has sought universal jurisdiction to prevent the world’s worst 
criminals from escaping justice by asserting that it lacks jurisdiction, the United States 
contends that extending the Court’s jurisdiction in this manner threatens the integrity of 
the international treaty-making process.  The Rome Statute holds that citizens of states 
that do not consent to be bound by this treaty can still come under its purview. 
A related U.S. concern is that the ICC would undermine the authority of the 
United Nations Security Council.  As John Bolton has noted, “Under the UN Charter, the 
Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.  The ICC’s efforts could easily conflict with the Council’s work…In 
requiring an affirmative Council vote to stop a case, the Statute shifts the balance of 
authority from the Council to the ICC.”21  This concern refers to Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute: “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that 
effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”22  In 
other words, any of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
could prevent adoption of such a resolution and thereby ensure the conduct of an 




                                                 
20 “Statement of David J. Scheffer: Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues And Head of the U.S. 
Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal 
Court: Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, July 23, 1998.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/USScheffer_Senate23July98.doc].  
Accessed 16 December, 2002. 
21 “The United States and the International Criminal Court: John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms 
Control and International Security: Remarks at the Aspen Institute- Berlin, Germany- September 16, 2002.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/USBolton_Aspen16Sept02.doc].  
Accessed 16 December 2002. 
22  “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” [http://www.iccnow.org/html/icc19990712.html].  
Accessed 16 October 2000. 
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C. FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN OBJECTIONS 
 
Thus, the withdrawal of the U.S. signature represents more than a simple rejection 
of the Court.23  Despite official statements that the United States is “not seeking to 
weaken the ICC,”24 U.S. actions suggest that Washington intends to actively oppose its 
capability to affect U.S. options.  These specific grievances are consistent with broader 
concerns about how the Court could negatively affect the U.S. governmental and legal 
system.  The Court is considered by some U.S. experts to threaten fundamental principles 
governing American society,25 including the clear delineation of powers among 
government branches, the accountability of each through representative elections, and a 
system of checks and balances.  Though supporters of the ICC claim that its prosecutor 
and judges will be “beyond reproach,”26 the system established by the Rome Statute has 
raised fears that officers of the Court not operating within guidelines as strict as the U.S. 
Constitution will threaten fundamental rights.  Cornell University’s Jeremy Rabkin, in an 
article entitled “International Law vs. the American Constitution: Something’s Got to 
Give,” captured the essence of American fears:  
But then what do the guarantees in the Bill of Rights mean if they can be 
side-stepped any time our government finds it more convenient to have 
Americans tried by foreign authorities?  We would then have a 
Constitution that can be amended without the bother of persuading three-
quarters of the states to adopt a formal amendment.27   
 
                                                 
23 The degree to which the Bush administration has opposed the ICC seems clear: “Sources report that the 
Bush administration is wary of setting any precedent of senior US officials testifying before international 
courts, particularly with regard to the International Criminal Court.”  “United States of America.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/theamericas/unitedstates.html]. Accessed 16 December 2002. 
24 “Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman of the US State Department: U.S. and Romania 
Sign Article 98 Agreement: August 1, 2002.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/USReekerArt98Romania1Auf02.doc]. 
Accessed 10 March 2003. – Please see Mr. Reeker’s comments regarding Article 98 agreements below in 
this chapter. 
25 According to The Economist,  “The political arguments are, in essence, that a strong democracy resents 
having its hands tied by international agreements, for doing so limits the rights of domestic voters and 
institutions to set their own rules.” (“Present at the Creation: A Survey of America’s World Role,” The 
Economist, 29 June 2002, 25.) 
26 “The ICC Treaty establishes strict criteria for the selection of the prosecutor and the judges, requiring 
experts whose reputation, moral character and independence are beyond reproach.” : (Human Rights 
Watch: “Myths and Facts About the International Criminal Court.”  
[http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/facts.htm]. Accessed 22 October 2002.) 
27Jeremy Rabkin, “International Law vs. the American Constitution: Something’s Got to Give,” The 
National Interest (Spring 1999): 35. 
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American fears about the power of the International Criminal Court are not totally 
unfounded, and appear quite reasonable given the unique Constitutional developments in 
the United States and the prevailing American perspective on international institutions. 
The U.S. objections to the ICC are grounded in principles embodied in the United 
States Constitution and American legal tradition.  An excellent summary of the 
constitutional and legal foundations of U.S. skepticism about the ICC is presented in “Sec 
2. Findings” of H.R. 4169 on 11 April 2002: 
(11)The Statute of the International Criminal Court also contravenes the 
principles of separation of powers, federalism, and trial by jury that are 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, because the 
International Criminal Court has been endowed with legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers and with criminal jurisdiction without regard to the 
jurisdiction of the United States and the several States.  (12)The 
International Criminal Court, by design and effect, is an illegitimate court, 
established contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, 
the American Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of the 
United States, and as such, puts United States citizens in jeopardy of 
unlawful and unconstitutional criminal prosecution, with members of the 
United States Armed Forces placed especially at risk of politically 
motivated arrests, prosecutions, fines, and imprisonments for acts engaged 
in for the protection of the sovereignty and independence of the United 
States.28 
 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman reaffirmed in May 
2002 that U.S. policy toward the ICC is based on American values: 
We believe that states, not international institutions are primarily 
responsible for ensuring justice in the international system.  We believe 
that the best way to combat these serious offenses is to build domestic 
judicial systems, strengthen political will and promote human 
freedom…We believe that the ICC undermines the role of the United 
Nations Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.  
We believe in checks and balances.  The Rome Statute creates a 
prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power.  We believe that in order 
to be bound by a treaty, a state must be party to that treaty.  The ICC 
asserts jurisdiction over citizens of states that have not ratified the treaty.  
This threatens US sovereignty.  We believe that the ICC is built on a 
                                                 
28 “American Servicemember and Citizen Protection Act of 2002 (Introduced in House)- 107th Congress, 
2d Session, H.R. 4169: “To provide that the International Criminal Court is not valid with respect to the 
United States, and for other purposes”: In the House of Representatives, April 11, 2002.” 
[http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/C?c107:./temp/~c1071nr6G2].  Accessed 7 September 2003.  These 
findings, part of H.R. 4169, were not included in the final version of the American Servicemembers’ 
Protection Act. 
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flawed foundation.  These flaws leave it open for exploitation and 
politically motivated prosecutions.29 
 
America’s withdrawal of its signature to the Rome Statute is also consistent with 
its historical reluctance to ratify certain types of international treaties.  The Economist 
discussed this phenomenon in its June 2002 survey of America’s world role: “[I]t is a 
paradox: America has promoted worldwide standards for human rights, military 
behaviour and even environmental protection, and has reinforced them through foreign 
aid, economic sanctions, moral suasion and even military intervention; yet Congress has 
often balked at ratifying the treaties codifying such standards, taking years to do it, 
demanding reservations on the treaties that nullify much of their domestic effect, or even 
rejecting them altogether.”30  Andrew Moravcsik of Harvard discusses the reluctance of 
the United States to be bound by international human rights treaties despite its domestic 
and international commitment to human rights.  Moravcsik notes: 
The United States has helped establish and enforce global human rights 
standards through rhetorical disapproval, foreign aid, sanctions, military 
intervention, and even multilateral negotiations.  It does so even in some 
areas—most recently humanitarian intervention in Kosovo—where the 
costs are potentially high.  At the same time, however, the United States 
remains extremely cautious about committing itself to the domestic 
application of binding international legal standards for human rights.  In 
particular, it has been hesitant to ratify multilateral human rights treaties, 
despite their acceptance among nearly all advanced industrial 
democracies, many developing democracies, and, in many cases, 
nondemocratic governments.  When the United States does ratify such 
treaties, it typically imposes so many reservations that ratification has no 
domestic effect.31 
 
Moravcsik charts the length of time it took the United  States Senate to give its 
advice and consent to the ratification of various major international human rights treaties, 
among them the Genocide Convention, the Torture Convention, and the Covenant on 
                                                 
29 “Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, DC, May 6, 2002.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/USUnsigningGrossman6May02.doc]. 
Accessed 10 March 2003. 
30 “Present at the Creation: A survey of America’s world role,” The Economist, 29 June 2002, 24. 
31 Andrew Moravcsik, “Why is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?” in Stewart Patrick and 
Shepard Forman, eds., Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 345. 
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Civil and Political Rights.32   The United States position toward the Court embodies 
America’s unique view of its world role, including its belief in the primacy of domestic 
legal and political systems, and is based on its unparalleled power and influence in 
international affairs.   Predictably, this position has fomented consternation among 
America’s closest allies in Europe. 
 
D. AMERICA’S ICC POLICY SINCE MAY 2002 
 
United States policy toward the International Criminal Court has caused 
diplomatic and political controversy for the United States and its closest allies, 
particularly those in Europe.  U.S. withdrawal from the Rome Statute in May 2002 
caused frustration among European supporters of the Court, and U.S. policies since the 
withdrawal have provoked further criticism.  European and American policies on the 
Court have clashed in three specific areas: the diplomatic dispute over United Nations 
Security Council resolutions sought by the United States in 2002 and 2003 exempting 
U.S. peacekeeping troops from ICC jurisdiction, America’s attempts to secure immunity 
for its personnel under so-called “Article 98 agreements,” and passage of the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002.  Each measure highlights the United States 
concern about the protection of U.S. citizens, one of the fundamental tasks of any 
sovereign government. 
 
1. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
 
On 30 June 2002, the United States vetoed the extension of the mandate for the 
United Nations peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), fearing that its 
personnel would be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction.33  On 10 July 2002, in a statement 
                                                 
32 Andrew Moravcsik, “Why is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?” in Stewart Patrick and 
Shepard Forman, eds., Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 357. 
33 “The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court: 
AMICC: Chronology of the U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal Court: From ‘Unsigning’ to 
Immunity Agreements.” [http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/factsheets/FS-AMICC-PostNullification.doc]. 
Accessed 10 March 2003. 
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to the U.N. Security Council, Ambassador John D. Negroponte, the United States 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, asserted that 
Peacekeeping is one of the hardest jobs in the world…Peacekeepers from 
states that are not party to the Rome Statute should not face, in addition to 
the dangers and hardships of deployment, additional, unnecessary legal 
jeopardy…Some have suggested that the United States is taking too 
alarmist a view of the dangers that the ICC poses to troop contributors.  I 
would argue that supporters of the ICC take too alarmist a view of the 
pragmatic solution that the U.S. is proposing.34 
 
The “pragmatic solution” proposed by the United States was to grant American 
troops serving as U.N. peacekeepers immunity from the ICC’s jurisdiction as a condition 
of their participation in U.N.-sponsored operations.  Thus, under diplomatic pressure 
from the United States, on 12 July 2002 the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1422, which reads in part:  “Requests, consistent with the provisions of 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former 
officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts 
or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a 
twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or 
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise.”35   
This one year exemption from the Court’s jurisdiction was up for review again in 
June 2003, when the U.N. Security Council approved resolution 1487 (2003), extending 
the exemption for an additional twelve-month period.  The text of the new resolution, 
nearly identical to that of 1422 (2002), reads in part: “Requests, consistent with the 
provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC…shall for a 12-month period 
starting 1 July 2003 not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of any 
such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise.”36  An important provision of 
                                                 
34 “Statement by Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative  
to the United Nations, on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Security Council, July 10, 2002.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/UnitedStatesSCDeb10July02.doc].  
Accessed 10 March 2003. 
35 “United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1422 (2002): Adopted by the Security Council at its 
4572nd meeting, on 12 July 2002.”  
[http://odsddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/477/61/PDF/N0247761.pdf?OpenElement]. Accessed 11 
March 2003. 
36 “United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1487 (2003): Adopted by the Security Council at its 
4772nd meeting, on 12 June 2003.” 
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this resolution that may be cause for concern for ICC supporters is the subsequent 
reiteration of its “intention to renew the request…under the same conditions each 1 July 
for further 12-month periods for as long as may be necessary.”37  
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed concern about this measure on 12 
June 2003: 
But allow me to express the hope that this does not become an annual 
routine.  If it did, I fear the world would interpret it as meaning that the 
Council wished to claim absolute and permanent immunity for people 
serving in the operations it establishes or authorizes.  If that were to 
happen, it would undermine not only the authority of the ICC but also the 
authority of the Council and the legitimacy of United Nations 
peacekeeping.38  
 
U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham, Deputy United States Representative to the 
United Nations, made the following remarks concerning the resolution at a 12 June 2003 
meeting of the Security Council:  
It balances divergent positions and helps to ensure against undermining of 
United Nations peace operations.  Like resolution 1422 (2002), resolution 
1487 (2003) exempts States that are not parties to the Rome Statute but 
that participate in United Nations operations from the ICC’s jurisdiction in 
a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with the 
1998 Rome Statute.  The resolution is consistent with a fundamental 
principle of international law: the need for a State to consent if it is to be 
bound.39  
 
U.S. reluctance to support peacekeeping missions absent clear protection from 
ICC jurisdiction, particularly the critical UNMIBH mission in Europe, and the annual re-
examination of exemptions for personnel of states not party to the Rome Statute could 
undermine U.S. relations with security partners in Europe. 
 
                                                 
[http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/1422/SCRes1487June2003eng.pdf]. Accessed 28 July 
2003. 
37 Ibid. 
38 “United Nations Security Council, Fifty-eighth year, 4772nd meeting- Thursday, 12 June  
2003, New York.” 




2. Article 98 “Immunity Agreements” 
 
From the perspective of the United States government, however, it is the 
reluctance of many European governments to grant exemptions for American personnel 
that could damage relations.  Conversely, European champions of the ICC hold that the 
dispute over the UN peacekeeping mandate stems from America’s requests for immunity 
for its citizens, officials, and personnel under so-called “Article 98” agreements.  Such 
agreements have generated considerable frustration as opponents of U.S. efforts argue 
that the United States is fundamentally misinterpreting Article 98 of the Rome Statute.  
Article 98 (2) states that 
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State 
is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the 
Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of 
consent for the surrender.40  
 
Based on its interpretation of Article 98, the United States has attempted to secure 
bilateral agreements with its allies that “would require states to send an American 
national requested by the ICC back to the U.S. instead of surrendering him/her to the 
ICC.”41  According to ICC Now, a non-governmental organization, the July 2002 
“Proposed Text of so-called Article 98 Agreements with the United States” reads as 
follows:  
3. When the United States extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a 
person of the other Party to a third country, the United States will not 
agree to the surrender or transfer of that person to the International 
Criminal Court by the third country, absent the expressed consent of 
the Government of X.   
4. When the Government of X extradites, surrenders, or otherwise 
transfers a person of the United States of America to a third country, 
the Government of X will not agree to surrender or transfer of that 
person to the International Criminal Court by a third country, absent 
the expressed consent of the Government of the United States.42 
                                                 
40 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” [http://www.iccnow.org/html/icc19990712.html].  
Accessed 16 October 2000. 
41 Human Rights Watch – “Bilateral Immunity Agreements: A Background Briefing, March 2003.” 
[http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/bilateralagreements.pdf]. Accessed 7 March 2003. 
42 “Proposed Text of so-called Article 98 Agreements with the United States- July 2002.”   
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Despite U.S. efforts, ICC advocates such as Human Rights Watch, an 
international non-governmental organization, have taken a forceful stance of their own 
against U.S. Article 98 agreements.  Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights 
Watch, stated that 
Article 98 recognizes agreements among ICC member states to resolve 
competing claims to prosecute a suspect…But if agreements under Article 
98 are to remain true to the purpose of the Rome treaty, they must respect 
the ICC’s right to intervene in national prosecutions should they prove to 
be a charade…The entire point of the ICC was never to trust unverified 
national pledges to bring the worst human rights criminals to justice.43 
 
In its 11 March 2003 issue of the “ICC Update,” the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, another non-governmental organization, criticized U.S. 
Article 98 agreements as being “contrary to international law and the Rome Statute” and 
argued that “States that sign these agreements would breach their obligations under the 
Rome Statute, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and possibly their own 
extradition laws.”44  This update also stated that “These states will also violate Article 18 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which obliges them to refrain from acts 
that would defeat the object and purpose of the Statute.”45  It might, however, be noted 
that the Vienna Convention also holds that a state must express consent to be bound by a 
treaty, and provides that “The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be 
expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.”46  
The United States has concluded “Article 98 agreements” with over fifty 
countries,47 including Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Romania. On 1 August 2002, 
                                                 
[http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/impunityart98/USArticle98Agreement1Aug02.doc]. 
Accessed 6 August 2003. 
43 Roth, Kenneth. “Resist Washington’s arm-twisting.” The International Herald Tribune, 30 September 
2002.  Available from [http://hrw.org/editorials/2002/icc0930.htm].  Accessed 28 February 2003. 
44 “March 11th 2003 Special Edition: ICC Update.”  
[http://www.iccnow.org/publications/update/iccupdate33Eng.pdf]. Accessed 14 March 2003. 
45 Ibid. 
46 “International Law Commission: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”  
[http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm:]. Accessed 20 June 2003. 
47 Fifty-three countries have signed Article 98 agreements with the United States as of 7 August, 2003. 
“Signatories of US Impunity Agreements (so-called Article 98 agreements), Last Updated: August 7, 
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the Deputy Spokesman of the U.S. State Department, Philip T. Reeker, commented on 
the U.S.-Romanian agreement: 
These agreements are consistent with the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and will help to provide the safeguards we seek to prevent 
the surrender of Americans to the ICC…By signing this bilateral 
agreement with the United States, the Romanian Government has shown 
that it understands our position, and the fact that we are not seeking to 
weaken the ICC or to undermine the integrity of international 
peacekeeping operations.48 
 
This U.S. government view of the aim of Article 98 agreements has clashed with 
that of ICC supporters, notably the members of the European Union, whose policies are 
analyzed in Chapter IV.  The U.S. search for immunity for its soldiers in peacekeeping 
roles has been bolstered by adoption of legislation designed to protect American military 
personnel. 
 
3. American Servicemembers’ Protection Act 
 
The United States has taken active measures to ensure that its soldiers never 
appear before the Court, as the Coalition for the International Criminal Court noted: 
On 2 August 2002, President George W. Bush signed the supplemental 
appropriations bill, making the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act 
binding US national law.  This act includes a provision that authorizes the 
use of military force to free any citizen of the US or ally country being 
held by the Court in The Hague.  In addition, the law provides for the 
withdrawal of U.S. military assistance from countries ratifying the ICC 
treaty, and restricts U.S. participation in United Nations peacekeeping 
unless the U.S. obtains immunity from prosecution.49   
 
America’s search for bilateral immunity agreements was complemented by  
President Bush’s signature of H.R. 4775 on 2 August 2002.  The President’s signature                                                  
2003.” [http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/impunityart98/BIASignatories7August03.doc].  
Accessed 27 August 2003. 
48 “Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman of the US State Department: U.S. and Romania 
Sign Article 98 Agreement: August 1, 2002.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/statements/governments/USReekerArt98Romania1Auf02.doc]. 
Accessed 10 March 2003. 
49 “United States of America.” [http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/theamericas/unitedstates.html]. 
Accessed 16 December 2002. 
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made the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 law.50  Among the findings 
in Sec. 2002, the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, are the following: 
(7) Any American prosecuted by the International Criminal Court will, 
under the Rome Statute, be denied procedural protections to which all 
Americans are entitled under the Bill of Rights to the United States 
Constitution, such as the right to trial by jury.  (8) …The United States 
Government has an obligation to protect the members of its Armed Forces, 
to the maximum extent possible, against criminal prosecutions carried out 
by the International Criminal Court…(11)…The United States is not a 
party to the Rome Statute and will not be bound by any of its terms.  The 
United States will not recognize the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court over United States nationals.51   
 
Subject to Presidential waiver under certain conditions and to termination should 
the United States ratify the Rome Statute, the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act 
of 2002 stipulates in Sec. 2004 (d) a “Prohibition on Extradition to the International 
Criminal Court”.  In Sec. 2005 (a) the Act states that the U.S. President should ensure 
that any American involvement in a mission under Chapter VI or VII of the U.N. Charter 
will exempt American forces from ICC jurisdiction and prosecution.  In Sec. 2007 the 
Act includes prohibitions on U.S. military assistance to states party to the Rome Statute, 
subject to Presidential waiver in the national interest and with NATO countries and 
certain other states exempted.  According to Sec. 2008 (a), “The President is authorized 
to use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any person 
described in subsection (b) who is being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the 
request of the International Criminal Court.”52   
The implications of this final provision were vividly demonstrated in an exchange 
between Pierre-Richard Prosper, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, 
and a British journalist in an “On-the-Record” briefing at the American Embassy in 
London on 20 September 2002.  The journalist asked, in reference to the American 
                                                 
50 “The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court: 
AMICC: Chronology of the U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal Court: From ‘Unsigning’ to 
Immunity Agreements.” [http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/factsheets/FS-AMICC-PostNullification.doc]. 
Accessed 10 March 2003. 
51 H.R. 4775: One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America- “Title II-  
American Service-Members’ Protection Act.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/aspa/aspa.doc].  Accessed 11 March 2003. 
52 Ibid. 
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Servicemembers’ Protection Act, “It is right to say that that would authorize the U.S. to 
use force to invade this country to rescue any prisoner, any U.S. prisoners, doesn’t it?  I 
mean, that is right as a matter of law?” Ambassador Prosper replied in part, “basically, it 
just says ‘Mr. President, this is within your range of tools in the toolbox but it’s for you to 
decide what tools are necessary, it’s not mandatory, it’s not required’ and what this 
President has done is that he obviously accepted the law but decided that what our range 
of tools should be is Article 98.”53   
Thus, the mere possibility that the American president could resort to force to 
repatriate an American citizen may induce some countries to sign Article 98 agreements.  
Though any American use of force against friendly states is highly unlikely, the fact that 
“all means necessary” are provided for in this Act may create difficulties for the United 
States in its diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis its closest allies.  Additionally, this Act does not 
specify exemptions on prohibitions of military aid to any non-NATO members of the 
European Union party to the Rome Statute, which could exacerbate European-American 
tensions in the future.  However, as noted above, the President can waive the prohibition 
on military assistance.  American actions in the summer of 2003 highlighted the scope of 
the ASPA.  On 30 June 2003 the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, a non-
governmental organization, noted that:  
The July 1, 2003 ASPA deadline, which coincides with the one year 
anniversary of the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the ICC, 
provides that any ICC State Party receiving U.S. military assistance will 
lose those funds unless a Presidential waiver is issued either on the basis 
of national security interests or because a country has signed a U.S.-
requested ICC immunity agreement by that date.54   
 
In a 1 July 2003 “Memorandum for the Secretary of State” U.S. President George 
W. Bush indicated which states should be granted a waiver of the prohibition on U.S. 
military assistance per section 2007(a) of the ASPA, either in view of their signature of 
                                                 
53 H.R. 4775: One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America- “Title II-  
American Service-Members’ Protection Act.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/aspa/aspa.doc].  Accessed 11 March 2003.   
54 “Coalition for the International Criminal Court: ‘U.S. Threatens to Cut Military Assistance to Nations 
Supporting the International Criminal Court: Law Pressures Non-U.S. Allies to Sign ICC Immunity Pacts’- 
New York, 30 June 2003.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/ciccmediastatements/2003/06.30.03ASPAdeadline.doc]. Accessed 1 
August 2003. 
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Article 98 agreements with the United States or for reasons of “national interest.”55  
According to a Reuters dispatch in the International Herald Tribune:  
The United States on Tuesday [1 July 2003] suspended military assistance 
to almost 50 countries, including Colombia and six nations seeking NATO 
membership, because they have supported the International Criminal 
Court and failed to exempt Americans from possible prosecution…The 
suspension covers international military education and training funds, 
which mainly pay the cost of educating foreign officers at U.S. 
institutions, and foreign military funding, which pays for U.S. weapons 
and other aid.56     
 
The Act’s passage into law in August 2002 has not improved European-American 
relations.  During an earlier phase of the legislative process the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act was approved by the U.S. Senate on 7 December 2001 
despite German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s October 2001 admonition to U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell that “adopting the ASPA would open a rift between the 
U.S. and the European Union on this important issue.”57  Ultimately, however, only the 
Court’s first cases and developing case law will provide initial indications as to whether 
American concerns are well founded.  Only diplomatic negotiations can prevent these 
three disputes—over the annual renewal of the United Nations Security Council 
peacekeeping mandate in Bosnia, Article 98 immunity agreements, and the provisions of 
the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act—from significantly damaging the 
transatlantic relationship. 
 
E. EVALUATION OF THE AMERICAN POSITION 
 
One common criticism leveled against the United States is that the withdrawal of 
its signature to the Rome Statute is hypocritical and illustrative of American arrogance 
                                                 
55 “Presidential Determination No. 2003-27, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Subject: Waiving 
Prohibition on United States Military Assistance to Parties to the Rome Statute Establishing the 
International Criminal Court.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/aspa/BushWaiver1July2003.doc]. Accessed 1 August 2003. 
56 Reuters, “U.S. stops military aid to nearly 50 nations over court dispute,” International Herald Tribune, 
2 July 2003. 
57 “Human Rights News: HRW World Report 2001: International Justice: ‘Europe Should Oppose U.S. 
Law on War Crimes Court.’” [http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/ASPAeu1210.htm]. Accessed 22 October 
2002. 
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regarding international laws and norms.  This claim is grounded on the fact that the 
United States helped to draft the Rome Statute, chose to sign it, albeit with reservations, 
and then withdrew its signature.  However, if withdrawal of one’s signature to the Rome 
Statute after participating in its framing and claiming to support its ideals is hypocritical, 
it would nevertheless be equally if not more hypocritical to maintain signature to a treaty 
with no intention of ever ratifying it.  It is far more honest and transparent to withdraw 
one’s signature from the treaty, particularly if one intends to obstruct its operation, 
actively or passively, since signing a treaty implies a minimal agreement not to impair its 
function.  In foreseeable circumstances there is no reasonable expectation that the Senate 
would give its advice and consent to the treaty’s ratification.   
Furthermore, the United States withdrew its signature because it determined that 
the ICC was not in its national or international interests, and that it could not in good faith 
agree to be subject to its provisions.  States that signed the treaty for politically expedient 
reasons or that seek its benefits but do not intend to conform to its rules should consider 
the hypocrisy of their own actions before criticizing the United States for withdrawing.  
American firmness in the face of international pressure stems from a long legal and 
constitutional tradition.  The treaty ratification process, which requires a two-thirds 
majority in the U.S. Senate,58 ensures that any treaty ratified must be widely accepted, 
and a treaty’s passage into U.S. law once ratified emphasizes the seriousness with which 
it is regarded.59  America has demonstrated its commitment to the legal principle of 
pacta sunt servanda in its all-or-nothing approach to international treaties.  The British 
weekly The Economist has referred to an American ideology of “exceptionalism”60 
regarding U.S. policy on international treaties and multilateral measures.  From a 
                                                 
58 The United States Constitution: Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.  Available from  
[http://www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html]. Accessed 12 March 2003. 
59 An interesting account of the American “treaty record” can be found in an essay by Andrew Moravcsik 
of Harvard University, “Why is US Human Rights Policy so Unilateralist?”  The essay includes a table of 
major human rights treaties that the United States Senate either never gave its advice and consent to or 
deliberated over for many years before doing so. Andrew Moravcsik, “Why is U.S. Human Rights Policy 
So Unilateralist?” in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds., Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Ambivalent Engagement (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 357. 
60 “Why the apparent hypocrisy, or at least stand-offishness? ‘Exceptionalism’ is often offered as the 
answer- the American ideology, laid down in the early constitutional documents, of being both separate and 
different.” -- (“Present at the Creation: A Survey of America’s World Role,” The Economist, 29 June 2002, 
24.)   
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European perspective, it is this exceptionalism that has caused such controversy in 
European-American relations, influencing the development of European Union policy 





























III- THE EUROPEAN UNION’S POSITION ON THE ICC: 
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 
A. EUROPEAN UNION POLICY TOWARD THE ICC 
 
The withdrawal of the United States signature to the Rome Statute caused 
consternation in European Union countries and generated considerable debate about both 
the Court and the more complex issues of American unilateralism and the perceived split 
between European and American views of the requirements of international order.  The 
disagreement over the International Criminal Court can be framed within the broader 
context of the myriad issues in U.S.-European relations as well as the traditions and 
perspectives that European Union countries bring to bear on the issue.  European Union 
positions in this matter reflect consistent support for the Court since the Rome Statute 
was framed and opened for signature in 1998.  This support has shaped European Union 
reactions to the U.S. withdrawal of America’s signature to the Rome Statute from the 
Court in 2002 and subsequent U.S. actions regarding the ICC. 
Every European Union member state61 has expressed support for the Court by 
ratifying the Rome Statute, and the Union has stated its official position supporting the 
ICC. Institutionally, the European Union has expressed considerable support for the 
Court and its acceptance by as many states as possible.  The Union outlined its basic 
policy in its “Council Common Position of 11th June 2001 On the International Criminal 
Court”: 
(3) The principles of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
as well as those governing its functioning, are fully in line with the 
principles and objectives of the Union.  (4) The serious crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court are of concern for all Member States, which are 
determined to cooperate for the prevention of those crimes and for putting 
an end to the impunity of the perpetrators thereof.  (5) The Union is 
convinced that compliance with the rules of international humanitarian 
                                                 
61 “All fifteen EU Member States and most of its associated and acceding countries have ratified the Rome 
Statute.” From an article in the “ICC Monitor” : “The International Criminal Court Monitor: The 
Newspaper of the NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court- Issue 23, February 2003.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/publications/monitor/23/Monitor23.200302English.pdf]. Accessed 7 March 2003. 
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law and human rights is necessary for the preservation of peace and the 
consolidation of the rule of law.62  
 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court, for the purpose of 
preventing and curbing the commission of the serious crimes falling 
within its jurisdiction, is an essential means of promoting respect for 
international humanitarian law and human rights, thus contributing to 
freedom, security, justice and the rule of law as well as contributing to the 
preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.63 
 
Subsequently, the European Council published its “Council Common Position 
2002/CFSP Amending Common Position 2001/443/CFSP on the International Criminal 
Court,” which discussed the imperative for members to promote “the objective of the 
widest possible participation in the Statute” via various forms of assistance to states 
aspiring to become party to the Court.  European Council Common Position 2002/CFSP 
stated:  
In order to contribute to the objective of the widest possible participation 
in the Statute, the European Union and its Member States shall make 
every effort to further this process by raising the issue of the widest 
possible ratification, acceptance, approval of or accession to the Rome 
Statute and the implementation of the Statute in negotiations or political 
dialogues with third States, groups of States or relevant regional 
organisations, whenever appropriate.64 
 
The European Union also drafted an “Action Plan to Follow-Up on the Common 
Position on the International Criminal Court”: “On 28 February 2002, the European 
Parliament approved a resolution on the ICC which, inter alia, called for the adoption of 
an EU action plan in furtherance of the Common Position.”65  This action plan addressed 
the “coordination of EU activities” and the “ratification and implementation of the Rome 
Statute in Third Countries,” among other issues.66  The official European Union position 
has also expanded to include hopes for increased cooperation with the United States on 
                                                 
62 “Conference on ‘The EC support for the establishment of the ICC’, Brussels, January 28- 
29 of 2002.” [http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/pdf/cpi-documents-synthese2002_en.pdf].   





matters involving the Court.  The Council of the European Union’s 30 September 2002 
“Draft Council conclusions on the International Criminal Court” stated this goal: “The 
Council expresses its hope that the United States will continue to work together with its 
allies and partners in developing effective and impartial international criminal justice.  To 
this end, the Council proposes to develop a broader dialogue between the European 
Union and the United States on all matters relating to the ICC, including future relations 
between the United States and the Court.”67 
Despite opposition from the United States government, Human Rights Watch 
encouraged the European Union to stand firm in its support of the Court: 
Human Rights Watch urged European Union governments to redouble 
their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the ICC treaty.  Because 
some states intending to ratify the ICC treaty may now be intimidated by 
the new U.S. legislation, EU governments should offer reassurances that 
they stand more firmly than ever behind the court, Human Rights Watch 
said.68 
 
The European Union position on the International Criminal Court and its response 
to the American withdrawal highlight the differences of opinion on this infant institution.  
The European Union’s position has evolved slightly since the drafting of the Rome 
Statute in 1998, but it has consistently expressed strong support for wide acceptance and 
implementation of the Rome Statute and attempted to address certain American 
concerns.69  The policies of three influential members of the European Union—France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom—illustrate the support for the Court within the EU. 
The United Kingdom’s response to the American position on the International 
Criminal Court may be the most subdued of any European Union country.  Its “special 
                                                 
67 “Council of the European Union- Brussels, 30 September 2002: Draft Council conclusions on the 
International Criminal Court.” 
[http://www.iccnow.org/documents/declarationsresolutions/intergovbodies/EUConclusions30Sept02.doc].  
Accessed 10 March 2003. 
68 “Human Rights News: HRW World Report 2001: International Justice: ‘Europe Should Oppose U.S. 
Law on War Crimes Court.’” [http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/ASPAeu1210.htm]. Accessed 22 October 
2002. 
69 The EU decided to allow its members to negotiate separate immunity agreements with the United States, 
subject to certain restrictions- see later citation from: “EU outlines conditions for non-surrender agreements 
with the USA.” [http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_442531.htm]. Accessed 15 
November 2002. 
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relationship” with the United States has enabled Britain to support and defend American 
policies with which it agrees, while more easily understanding and accepting those it 
opposes.  In a press conference on 28 June 2002 when queried, “But if you can’t get him 
[U.S. President George W. Bush] to play nice back, on Kyoto for instance or on the 
International Criminal Court or other subjects that are important to Britain and to you, 
then it looks one-sided,” British Prime Minister Tony Blair responded: 
I think you would have to say that that is always going to be the case, 
there are always going to be differences between us…I think the 
relationship is basically good and of course there are going to be 
differences, but this idea that because America doesn’t do everything that 
Britain or Europe wants that means the relationship is one-sided I think is 
nonsense, because both sides gain a lot from it.70 
 
Though it supports the Court, Britain has demonstrated its willingness to refrain 
from criticizing the American position on the issue.  Such acceptance from a fellow 
permanent member of the UN Security Council and supporter of American policies in 
Iraq and in the campaign against terrorism is critical for an American administration now 
facing the political repercussions of its withdrawal of the U.S. signature from the Rome 
Statute.  British support for the ICC could shift based on its foreign military 
commitments in the future, as London’s Daily Telegraph suggested in November 2002: 
“The Government is concerned that British servicemen and women involved in any war 
against Iraq could find themselves facing action from the International Criminal Court, 
defence sources said yesterday.”71  This concern appears to have some foundation, in 
that the Athens Bar Association in July 2003 “filed a lawsuit at the International Criminal 
Court in the Hague…seeking the indictment of Tony Blair, the UK prime minister, on 
war crimes charges over the attack against Iraq.”72  Thus, though the United Kingdom 
supports the Court, it appears committed to maintaining its positive relationship with the 
United States and exhibits a sensitive understanding of the U.S. position, given American 
military commitments worldwide. 
                                                 
70 10 Downing Street Newsroom: Press Conference by the Prime Minister Tony Blair: 28 June 2002.  
[http://www.numer-10.gov.uk/output/page5390.asp]. Accessed 4 December 2002. 
71 Michael Smith, “’War crimes’ fear for British troops.” The Daily Telegraph (London). 6  
November 2002.  Available from [http://www.lexis.com/research].  Accessed 15 November 2002. 
72 Kerin Hope and Nikki Tait, “Greeks try to indict Blair for Iraq war,” Financial Times, 29 July 2003, 3. 
31 
German reaction to the U.S. withdrawal has been perhaps the most predictable.  
The Federal Republic of Germany has been a staunch supporter of the Court from its 
early beginnings in 1998, which seems consistent with its strong post-1949 tradition of 
sensitivity to human rights and international justice.  Given its leading economic role in 
European affairs and organizations, Germany’s opposition to the U.S.-led military 
campaign in Iraq in March-April 2003 and to the withdrawal of the U.S. signature from 
the Rome Statute is cause for concern.  In September 2002 The Economist noted that: 
Mr. Bush’s administration is not getting a good German press.  The list of 
gripes is long: many Germans deplore Mr. Bush’s hostility to the 
International Criminal Court….the Americans’ apparently growing 
unilateralism; and now its policy on Iraq.  At home it does Mr. Schroeder 
no harm to be bravely standing up to the perceived American bully.73  
 
The official German position remains strongly in favor of the ICC, as Juergen 
Chrobog, State Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, highlighted on 9 September 2002: 
I therefore call upon all signatory states that have not yet ratified the Rome 
Statute to do so as soon as possible.  And I appeal to all states that have 
reservations about the Court to overcome their misgivings and adopt a 
policy of good neighbourliness to the ICC.  We are ready to accommodate 
them.  But it must be clear that the solutions to any problems they may 
have cannot violate the key obligation of all States Parties to cooperate 
fully with the Court...Germany continues to believe that making the 
International Criminal Court an effective and credible instrument for the 
prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes 
of aggression is of prime importance.74 
 
When faced with the U.S. position on the Court and U.S. pressure on 
governments to conclude separate agreements excluding U.S. personnel from the Court’s 
jurisdiction, the German position remained firm yet tempered by a desire to seek EU 
consensus: 
Speaking on this issue in Brussels, Federal Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer said:  ‘We are against the conclusion of special agreements and 
will also not sign any ourselves.’  On the fringe of the conference, 
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74 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United States: Statement by Mr. Juergen Chrobog, State 
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however, he admitted there was a need for a common position of the EU 
member states.75  
 
In late 2002 German Foreign Minister Fischer emphasized the need for common 
European Union action vis-à-vis the ICC.  “In Brussels…the German foreign minister, 
Joschka Fischer, again called for EU unity: ‘The main concern is that Europeans stand 
together and that they do so on the basis of strengthening the statutes of the Court.’”76  
The German “Gesellschaft fuer Voelkerstrafrecht” (International Criminal Law Society) 
issued a press release in Berlin expressing the opinion that it would be dangerous to 
relent under U.S. pressure: 
Moreover, the conclusion of the proposed agreement with the US 
would serve as a very bad example.  Other states opposed to the ICC 
would probably feel encouraged to seek similar agreements and 
thereby limit the Court’s jurisdiction even further…   We are today 
facing the danger of an international community dividing into two 
classes with a different set of rules applying depending on the political 
and military strength of a government.  This is a threat to the one 
principle lying at the basis of international relations- the principle of 
sovereign equality of states.  To undermine this principle would mean 
to undermine the integrity of international law.77  
 
Germany strongly supports the Court and seems unlikely to be pressured into 
negotiating with the United States on the issue. 
France has also been highly supportive of the newly founded International 
Criminal Court, and its skeptical view of American policy can be traced to certain 
recurring themes in Franco-American relations.  During the Cold War France had an 
almost reluctant partnership with the United States, whereby it often sought to assert its 
autonomy, such as when it exited NATO’s integrated military command structure.78  
Recent French foreign policy has focused on European matters and has often clashed 
                                                 
75 “EU outlines conditions for non-surrender agreements with the USA.” 
[http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_442531.htm]. Accessed 15 November 2002. 
76 “EU seeks common position towards the USA in relation to the International Criminal  
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with American views and policies, as The Economist noted in its summer 2002 survey of 
America’s role in the world:   
[D]isgruntled allies…can make life even harder for America by accepting 
its leadership but also surreptitiously selling trouble-makers the 
wherewithal to cause more trouble, such as missile technology or nuclear 
materials, or merely doing investment deals with the pariahs.  That is what 
France, China and Russia have been doing, to different degrees, in recent 
years, in particular in Iraq.79 
 
France’s support for the ICC has been clear, as stated by French Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs Renaud Muselier at the 57th UN General Assembly in New York on 
10 September 2002: 
We have travelled a long road to make the International Criminal Court a 
reality.  But our task did not end on 1 July 2002 when the Rome Statute 
entered into force.  We still have a crucial goal to reach: making the Court 
a universal institution…Without the cooperation of States, the ICC will be 
a court only on paper.  Even more than the international criminal courts, 
this court would be powerless if States failed to cooperate.80  
 
In March 2002 French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine presented his conception 
of the European view of American behavior: 
Europe is genuinely perplexed when faced with a US administration 
which, in just over a year, has opposed the Kyoto Protocol (on climate 
change), the International Criminal Court and several disarmament 
agreements, while abusing its veto at the UN Security Council on Middle 
East issues…We feel this heavy-handed tendency is increasing.  The 
United States is certainly not the only country that believes it has a 
universal mission, but it is the only one that has the means for it and thinks 
this role entirely legitimate.81  
 
The French view of European opinions of America was also noted in The 
Economist: “This week, Le Monde, noting that Europeans see Americans as ‘arrogant, 
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bellicose and deaf to all criticism’, decried a new period of American ‘messianism’.”82  
The United States has reason to be sensitive to French concerns about its policies, 
particularly on the issue of the Court, given France’s leading role in the EU and its status 
as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.  
 
B. FOUNDATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION POSITION 
 
The European Union position on the ICC has foundations in decades of 
constructing supranational institutions.  The European Union’s current effort to draft a 
constitution illustrates how its member states are comfortable with supranational 
authorities and institutions.  In the 18 July 2003 “Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe,” Article 1 states that “this Constitution establishes the European Union, on 
which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common” 
and Article 2 states that “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.  These 
values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and non-discrimination.”83   These articles highlight the concept of European 
Union states transferring certain powers to a central organization in the interests of 
justice, peace, and efficiency.  Their desire to embrace international judicial institutions 
such as the ICC is probably related to their willingness to participate in a semi-federal 
system.   
The commitment of many European Union governments to the Court is apparent 
given their current efforts to adapt their constitutional and legal systems to accommodate 
the ICC’s provisions.  Three of Europe’s most powerful states, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, have all begun integrating elements of the Rome Statute into their 
respective national systems.  The United Kingdom passed its “ICC Act of 2001” that 
“incorporates into domestic law the offences in the Rome Statute and makes provisions 
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for them to be dealt with domestically in the Crown Court,”84 Germany’s “Bundestag 
(Parliament) unanimously approved the draft act on the Code of Crimes against 
International Law (which consolidate and complete the list of criminal offences under 
German domestic law, paralleling the crimes under the Rome Statute) as well as the draft 
act on implementing legislation” on 25 April 2002,85 and “The French Parliament 
adopted the Bill on Cooperation in February 2002” which “allows France to cooperate 
with the Court with regard to arrest, transfer, prison sentences and reparation orders.”86   
European Union countries have considerable experience with transnational legal 
institutions whose decisions have affected their policies.  British barrister Geoffrey 
Robertson argues in his seminal work Crimes Against Humanity: The Search for Global 
Justice: 
What has made the European Court stand head and shoulders above any 
UN or other regional arrangement is the simple fact that adverse decisions 
are implemented, under supervision.  State parties comply (albeit 
sometimes not quickly or adequately) with its rulings, even though they 
generally require legislation or some restructuring of the domestic legal 
system.  It has now become a constitutional court for the whole 
continent.87   
 
Robertson endorses the example set by European Union institutional efforts: “The 
European Court of Human Rights has become the model human rights court, proof 
positive that international law can work to enforce fundamental freedoms across a swathe 
of countries with some differences in culture and tradition.”88   
European Union governments have had extensive experience with supranational 
legal and government institutions, and this contributes to their willingness to accept the 
Court’s authority.  Karen J. Alter, assistant professor of government at Smith College, 
contends that “The European Union has the most effective international legal system in 
existence, standing in clear contrast to the typical weakness of international law and 
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international courts…In Europe, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) hears many cases, 
and its jurisprudence shapes state behavior. There is an international rule of law that truly 
works in Europe.”89   
The tendency of European Union countries to actively support the ICC probably 
reflects unique European traditions and perspectives.  European acceptance of federative 
solutions has been shaped by the lingering memory of the destruction and trauma of the 
Second World War, which bred legitimate concerns for security and stability on the 
European continent.  Concepts of European community, institutionalized in the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union,90 illustrate this post-war European trend toward 
communitarian behavior.  Integration among European countries often competes, 
however, with parochial interests and national pride. Moreover, a shared desire to atone 
for failures of humanitarian interventions in the 1990s from Rwanda to Bosnia may help 
to explain the European Union’s willingness to support the Court. 91 
European Union support for the Court is consistent with views of power, 
international relations, and the rule of law in the EU countries.  According to Robert 
Kagan, “European strategic culture” is comprised of the following elements: 
the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on 
international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on 
multilateralism over unilateralism…This is what many Europeans believe 
they have to offer the world: not power, but the transcendence of power.  
The “essence” of the European Union, writes [Steven] Everts, is “all about 
subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law,” and Europe’s experience 
of successful multilateral governance has in turn produced an ambition to 
convert the world.92   
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Cultural differences aside, this disagreement comes at an important time for the 
Atlantic Alliance, when European Union countries face challenges that promise to 
determine the future of the continent.  These challenges include an enlarging membership 
and efforts at greater cohesion, as typified by debate over a constitution for Europe.  
Hence, European Union countries are forced to balance national sovereignty with 
regional integration, while also adapting their political and economic systems to 
accommodate new members. 
The continuing debate over the future relevance and roles of NATO, featured 
most recently at the Alliance’s Prague Summit in November 2002,93 also challenges 
European countries to address difficult military and foreign policy issues.  This challenge 
is particularly poignant given current attitudes in many European countries toward 
defense expenditures,94 the military establishment, and intervention in foreign crises.  
Certain European countries also face difficult prospects of mending diplomatic relations 
with the United States in the wake of the American-led invasion of Iraq in March-April 
2003 to topple the regime of dictator Saddam Hussein. 
Many Europeans also view the withdrawal of the United States signature from the 
Rome Statute as yet another of America’s refusals to submit itself to standards and 
obligations accepted by other nations, including EU states.  The United States previously 
refused to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Ottawa Landmine 
convention and the Kyoto Protocols on global warming.  Baroness Shirley Williams, a 
“longtime member of the House of Commons and a former education minister…and now 
leader of the Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords,” commented on this American 
behavior with respect to international treaties:   
We Atlanticists, dedicated to building global respect for democracy and 
the rule of law, were saddened by the reluctance of Congress to take part 
in laying what we saw as the essential foundation stones.  These were the 
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International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocols to the Climate Change 
Convention and the network of arms control agreements ranging from the 
Biological Weapons convention to a revised ABM Treaty.  They extended 
later to the proposals for dealing with heavily indebted poor countries and 
limiting exports of arms.  None attracted the support of the Bush 
administration.95 
 
Britain’s The Economist expressed the views of many Europeans when faced with 
such American policies: “Kyoto and the international court have, in effect, become the 
two most powerful witnesses deployed in the anti-Americans’ case, especially in Europe: 
look, the critics are able to say, the United States is in favour of pollution and against 
justice.”96  Though U.S. Presidents and Members of Congress have rejected such treaties 
for sound reasons, their justifications have often been poorly communicated, resulting in 
the widespread impression that the United States considers itself “above the law.”  
America’s reluctance to subordinate itself to many international organizations, despite its 
founding role therein, causes friction at a time when European Union countries are 
increasing their involvement in them.  Historically, European countries have supported 
international treaties and willingly accepted certain levels of international oversight and 
regulation, particularly in the context of the European integration process underway since 
1951, manifest today in the European Union.   
The predominant European position supports the ideals of the International 
Criminal Court and its full implementation as currently constituted.  This position finds 
no contradiction between a world court with broad jurisdiction and individual 
constitutional guarantees, and it is skeptical of American reticence about the Court.  From 
the European perspective, American concerns have been adequately addressed and 
continued American insistence on opposing the Court will only inflame diplomatic 
frustrations on both sides. 
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C. EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO U.S. POST-MAY 2002 ICC POLICIES 
 
It is not surprising that U.S. actions since the May 2002 withdrawal of its 
signature from the Rome Statute have caused concern among European allies.  European 
Union countries have generally opposed moves by the United States to shield its 
personnel from the ICC’s jurisdiction since May 2002, yet have cooperated where 
necessary to ensure the integrity of the ICC as well as broader interests such as 
implementation of the United Nations Security Council peacekeeping mandate in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  The U.S. search for Article 98 “immunity agreements” has been the most 
divisive issue, however, since it is at the heart of current fault lines in Europe between 
established members of the European Union and potential future members.  The Article 
98 issue has highlighted divisions between what some have termed “Old Europe” and the 
“New Europe” consisting of eastern European, predominantly former Soviet-bloc, states 
that have sought advantage in aligning themselves more closely with the United States on 
a range of issues, including the global war on terrorism. 
 
1. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
 
The controversy in June and July 2002 surrounding the American veto of 
extension of the United Nations Security Council mandate for the Bosnia peacekeeping 
mission, until adequate protections for US peacekeepers from ICC jurisdiction existed, 
compelled European countries, particularly France and the United Kingdom, to grant 
concessions to the United States.  This issue illustrated the subtle power politics involved 
in the debate over the ICC, as European countries that support the Court were nonetheless 
persuaded to grant exemptions to American peacekeepers in order to maintain the 
integrity of the mission in the former Yugoslavia.  Thus, in an early test of American 
diplomacy regarding the Court, it became clear that at least in some circumstances the 
United States has favorable prospects for securing acquiescence, if only grudging and in 
service to other interests, to its demands concerning the ICC.   
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At a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on 12 June 2003, Greek Ambassador 
and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Adamantios Th. Vassilakis, 
speaking on behalf of the European Union, noted that: 
The European Union is of the view that the inclusion in resolution 1422 
(2002) of the phrase “renew the request…under the same conditions each 
1 July for further 12-month periods for as long as may be necessary” 
(resolution 1422 (2002), para. 2) cannot be interpreted as permitting the 
automatic renewal of that resolution without taking into account the 
specific conditions under which such a request is being made.  The 
European Union firmly believes that an automatic renewal of that 
resolution would undermine the letter and the spirit of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and of its fundamental purpose—to put an 
end to impunity for the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community by bringing to justice in all cases all those within the Court’s 
jurisdiction.97 
 
Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated in 
Resolution 1336 (2003)[1]: 
6. The Assembly regrets the renewal, as decided on 12 June 2003, of 
Security Council Resolution 1422 (adopted on 12 July 2002).  This 
Resolution had deferred for a renewable 12 months any prosecution by 
the International Criminal Court of those suspected of offences 
committed in connection with a United Nations authorised operation 
who are nationals of states that are not parties to the Statute.  It 
commends those countries which insisted that an open debate was held 
in the Security Council and that the exemption was again limited to 
one year.   
7. It considers that Resolution 1422 and its renewal constitutes a           
legally questionable and politically damaging interference with the 
functioning of the International Criminal Court.  Its independence 
from the UN Security Council, with regard to the opening of 
procedures against persons suspected of international crimes, is one of 
the most important advances in the Rome Statute.98 
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In addition to opposing American efforts to gain exemptions for U.S. soldiers in 
U.N. peacekeeping missions, the European Union rejects the American search for 
bilateral immunity agreements. 
 
2. Article 98 “Immunity Agreements” 
 
The European Union has generally resisted America’s efforts to negotiate separate 
bilateral Article 98 agreements with other countries.  It first allowed some bilateral 
agreements based on minimal standards and then amended its policy to reject such 
agreements.  This shift in policy highlights the degree to which European Union countries 
were willing to consider and attempt to alleviate American concerns, even though 
America’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute is viewed by many as a 
“slap in the face” to its European partners and to institutions and practices of international 
law.  The solidification of EU policy against American efforts to conclude Article 98 
agreements also illustrates likely implications for the United States if it continues to put 
pressure on countries to make such accords.   Though the official European Union 
position on such agreements appeared resolute, it was temporarily modified to 
accommodate America’s wishes for immunity for its peacekeepers.  The Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court outlined the initial EU position: 
The common position, which reaffirms the EU’s commitment to uphold 
the integrity of the Rome Statute, firmly rejects the US-proposed 
agreements as inconsistent with international law, emphasizes the need to 
assess existing bilateral agreements to determine the necessity of 
additional agreements, and establishes a ‘bottom line’ set of principles to 
which each Member State must adhere in its negotiations of any such 
arrangement.99 
 
According to an October 2002 press release from the German government, the 
conditions by which independent agreements should be governed were expanded as 
follows: 
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On 30 September 2002, in Brussels, the foreign ministers of the 15 EU 
member states agreed a common position on American proposals for the 
exemption of US citizens from the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)…In many cases, so-called Status of Forces 
Agreements and extradition treaties already regulate whether an individual 
can be extradited to the USA.  If a country still wishes to conclude a 
separate agreement with the USA concerning the ICC, the EU insists on 
the following guiding principles:  
*Exclusion of a general immunity from punishment.  Individuals who are 
not surrendered to the ICC must stand trial in the USA.   
*Only US citizens working abroad on behalf of the American government, 
i.e. soldiers and diplomats, are to be exempted from the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.   
*Exemption should not apply to citizens of the country that concludes an 
agreement with the USA.  They should still be surrendered to the ICC.100  
 
The Economist commented in October 2002 on what it viewed as a license for 
individual EU members to deviate from the official European Union position: “This week 
the EU front collapsed.  The British, Spaniards and Italians proved readier to break ranks 
than to break with their superpower ally.  EU foreign ministers agreed that each of the 15 
members could sign up with the United States to whatever it chose, subject to some EU 
guidelines, which are supposed to ensure that wrongdoers not sent to the ICC face their 
own national courts.”101  A few days later Amnesty International argued that nations 
should avoid separate agreements with the United States: “Amnesty International today 
urged the foreign ministers of France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom not to sign 
agreements granting impunity [sic] to US nationals accused of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.”102  What began as an officially unified European Union 
position was modified to allow certain national concessions under American pressure; 
however, continued American efforts precipitated a shift in EU policy. 
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In response to American entreaties, the European Council drafted guiding 
principles on this issue on 30 September 2002, declaring that states could only sign 
agreements with the United States if they met the following conditions:  
*No impunity: A guarantee that an appropriate investigation and    
  potential prosecution would be undertaken by national  
  jurisdictions.   
*No reciprocity: The exclusion of nationals of ICC States Parties  
  from coverage of such an agreement.   
*No universal scope: The limitation of coverage to those persons   
  present in a territory because they have been sent by a sending      
  State (i.e., those conducting  official business).   
*Ratification: The agreement must be approved according to the  
  constitutional procedures of each individual state.103 
 
However, despite these guidelines, Human Rights Watch noted that, “As of 
January 27, 2003, Washington has had NO success: EU Members have so far refused to 
deviate from the EU position.”104   
On 19 September 2002 the European Parliament drafted a “Common Motion for a 
Resolution” expressing the following opinion:  “Deeply disappointed by the decision of 
the Romanian government to sign an agreement with the U.S. contradicting the spirit of 
the status of the ICC and worried that three other applicant countries, Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, [and] Malta haven’t yet ratified the treaty.”105  This issue threatens to divide 
Europe between current EU member states and those striving for EU membership.  
However, no EU member state has concluded an Article 98 agreement with the United 
States, and the EU position remains firm. The European Parliament’s draft motion 
continued: “whereas the current world-wide political pressure by the Government of the 
United States of America to persuade States Parties and Signatory States of the Rome 
Statute as well as non-signatory states to enter into bilateral immunity 
                                                 
103 “Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court: Bush Administration Demands 
Immunity Agreement.” [http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/article98/article98home.html]. Accessed 22 
October 2002. 
104 Human Rights Watch – “Bilateral Immunity Agreements: A Background Briefing, March 2003.” 
[http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/bilateralagreements.pdf]. Accessed 7 March 2003; underlining 
and capitalization in the original. 
105 “European Parliament: Common Motion for a Resolution, 19 September 2002.”   
[http://www.iccnow.org/documents/declarationsresolutions/intergovbodies/EP%20Resolution_19  
Sept02.doc]. Accessed 10 March 2003. 
44 
agreements…should not succeed with any country, in particular with the EU Member 
States, [and] the applicant countries to the EU.”106   
The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1336 (2003)[1] also 
stated, in reference to the U.S. attempt to secure Article 98 immunity agreements:  
The Assembly condemns the pressures exercised on a number of member 
states of the Council of Europe to enter into such agreements and regrets 
that the contradictory demands made on them by the United States on the 
one side and the European Union and the Council of Europe on the other 
confronts them with a false choice between European and transatlantic 
solidarity.  The Assembly considers that all countries should be left free to 
decide on their stance towards the International Criminal Court on the 
basis of considerations of principle alone.107   
 
Additionally, the European Union has solidified its position regarding Article 98 
agreements sought by the United States.  According to a “Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court” press release on 10 June 2003: “[T]he EU Political and Security 
Committee today adopted a revised Common Position reinforcing EU support for the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).  The new EU Common Position includes for the first 
time a call to prevent the signature of US-proposed non-surrender agreements [that is, 
“Article 98 agreements”] amidst increased US pressure [on the EU] to disengage from 
influencing countries involved in US negotiations.”108  The EU position has thus evolved 
during the course of this dispute from first accommodating U.S. concerns in certain 
instances and then later rejecting the negotiation of bilateral agreements.  This hardening 
of European Union policy is based on controversial U.S. actions since the May 2002 
withdrawal of the U.S. signature.  Whether EU member states will remain united in 
opposition to American pressures to conclude Article 98 agreements may determine the 
course of this dispute in the future.  Furthermore, the United States government may learn 
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a valuable lesson about the possible negative effects of its ICC policies with regard to 
relations with its partners in the European Union. 
 
3. American Servicemembers’ Protection Act 
 
U.S. passage of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act has inflamed 
European opinion, particularly given earlier efforts by the European Union to address 
U.S. concerns and allow its members to negotiate on the issue of immunity on a limited 
basis. Additionally, provisions distinguishing between NATO and non-NATO EU 
members regarding military assistance by the United States could damage U.S. relations 
with European states that are not NATO members.  Provisions for the use of force to 
repatriate an American citizen detained by the Court, including the legislation’s implicit 
if far-fetched authorization of forceful intervention against the Netherlands (the site of the 
ICC’s headquarters in The Hague) to this end, indicate a further lack of trust in 
international legal institutions and in an American ally in Europe.   
British barrister Geoffrey Robertson reacted to an earlier version of this law in the 
following manner: 
The Bush administration’s real irresponsibility, however, had come on 25 
September 2001 when it gave its support for the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) which sought to prohibit military 
aid to countries which ratify the Rome Statute (with the exception of allies 
like NATO and Israel) and to give the President power to use military 
force against any country which detains US soldiers on ICC arrest 
warrants.  This ‘bomb the Hague bill’ promoted by Senator [Jesse] Helms 
and Henry Kissinger so appalled European coalition partners in the ‘war 
on terror’ that the White House quietly prevailed on the Bill’s backers to 
withdraw it from the Senate.  When allies become more disposable, there 
is every prospect that the Bill will return.  It is, after all, consonant with 
the American position on international justice (as on Kyoto, and the 
Children and Landmines Conventions), namely that it is good for other 
countries, but not for the US.109 
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The United States has, as Robertson predicted, renewed this measure.  The 
President signed the Act of Congress, and the ASPA became law in August 2002.  The 
effect on European opinion is understandable given the sensitive military aid issues 
involved and the European Union position on the ICC.  Further ramifications of this law 
are explored in Chapter V. 
 
D. EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION POSITION 
 
European Union reactions to the United States policy on the ICC are often as 
much reactions to the unilateralist pattern and perceived arrogance of American foreign 
policy as they are specifically addressed to the legal and practical issues surrounding the 
Court.  The United States must be aware of and respect this European Union position and 
work to avoid categorization of its policies as unilateralist, particularly on controversial 
issues such as the Court.  Roy Denman, former representative of the European 
Commission in Washington, analyzed the disparity in European and American views as 
follows: 
So the Kyoto Protocol on the environment and the proposal for an 
International Criminal Court had little appeal.  Was American industry in 
the wide open spaces of the West to be shackled by regulations drafted for 
overcrowded foreign cities?  Were American citizens to be handed over to 
some anonymous bunch of foreign judges with no concept of American 
traditions or values?  Europeans find it easier to accept involvement in the 
outside world because for hundreds of years they were ruling parts of it as 
well as fighting each other.110 
 
On 9 July 2002 the EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, 
delivered a thoughtful critique of the shortcomings of American policy on the Court and 
the dangers that it posed for the future: 
The United States was fully engaged in the Rome Conference that 
prepared the ICC.  It sought all sorts of assurances, and it got them.  For 
example:  The ICC is complementary to national courts…The ICC will 
not be retrospective…Investigations can proceed only after a pretrial 
chamber has determined there is a reasonable basis for action…Under 
Article 16 of the ICC Statute the U.N. Security Council can decide to 
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block prosecutions for fixed periods.  In short, the United States demanded 
elaborate safeguards, and it got them.  But in a pattern that has become 
wearily familiar in other contexts such as the Kyoto Climate Change 
Treaty, it then revoked its intention to sign.  This technique carries serious 
long-term risks.  Why should people make concessions to America if the 
United States is going to walk away in any case?  I deeply regret the 
decision, because I admire the United States and know how its decision 
will be interpreted.  The United States will be accused of putting itself 
above the law.111   
 
Patten’s remarks are indicative of the complexity of European Union views of its 
superpower partner across the Atlantic, and the United States must be sensitive to these 
opinions in its future policies toward the Court.  The European Union has retained its 
official commitment to the International Criminal Court.  Despite previously allowing its 
members to negotiate with the United States on possible Article 98 agreements on a 
national basis, the European Union has solidified its support for the Court and its 
opposition to American entreaties for separate immunity agreements.  America’s 
firmness in upholding its policies since May 2002, particularly its recent suspension of 
military aid to certain countries, may serve to isolate the European Union from the United 
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IV- DIVERGENCE IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN UNION VIEWS: 
WHAT IS THIS DISPUTE REALLY ABOUT? 
The United States and European Union countries have formulated policies toward 
the International Criminal Court consistent with their respective political, cultural and 
historical traditions.  Despite diverging views of the Court’s potential, both sides share 
strong legal traditions and the agreed goal of bringing perpetrators of terrible crimes such 
as genocide to justice.  Hence, the debate over the International Criminal Court is actually 
less a dispute about its specific legal aspects and prospects for advancing norms of 
international justice than it is a political controversy highlighting fundamental differences 
within the Euro-Atlantic relationship.  
One of the most intriguing aspects of the debate over the ICC has been its 
symbolic importance in transatlantic relations.  The essence of the quarrel between the 
United States and European Union countries has been that the International Criminal 
Court is an international institution symbolic of broader asymmetry between the two 
sides, an asymmetry that has become apparent in new ways since the end of the Cold 
War.  The controversy surrounding the Court represents the disparity in power between 
the United States and Europe, illustrates the paradox of the common ends of international 
justice both sides seek despite disagreement over the proper means of achieving them, 
and highlights diversity in European and American strategic and diplomatic cultures.  
Furthermore, its legal precepts aside, the Court has become a political tool wielded by 
both parties in their multilateral intercourse and in their relations with post-communist 
states in Eastern and Central Europe that are seeking to further integrate themselves with 
the democratic West by joining NATO and the European Union.   Indeed, European and 
American commentators often appear to be “talking past one another” in their remarks 
concerning the Court and associated issues. 
 
A. POWER DISPARITY 
  
The controversy over the International Criminal Court is indicative of a power 
disparity between the United States and European Union countries.  This disparity tends 
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to breed resentment and encourages characterizations of American foreign policy as 
unilateralist and European policies as multilateralist.  This section analyzes the power 
disparity between states on the two sides of the North Atlantic Ocean, evaluates the 
“paradox of American power” in current affairs, explores the role of American 
unilateralism in competition with European multilateralism, and examines the 
relationship between the United Nations Security Council and the ICC as an example of 
the role of power in trans-Atlantic relations. 
It is no secret that, by a host of measures, the United States is militarily more 
powerful than the European Union countries.  This power gap is in itself not surprising, 
but the means by which this divide has come to influence the policy-making and strategic 
calculations of Europeans and Americans is intriguing indeed.   
The United States views international treaties and institutions from a position of 
considerable global power, both “hard” and “soft”, and as such enjoys a remarkable 
amount of autonomy in its policy-making with regard to such organizations and 
commitments.  As noted by Christopher Layne of the Cato Institute, “A hegemonic 
power like the United States today has overwhelming hard power—especially military 
power—and indeed there is no state or coalition with commensurate power capable of 
restraining the United States from exercising that power.”112  European Union countries, 
on the other hand, generally approach multilateral treaties and institutions from a position 
of weakness relative to the United States.  Professor David P. Calleo of Johns Hopkins 
University has asserted that 
Just as it is unwise to underestimate the vitality of this new Europe, it is 
wrong to believe it unconcerned with power.  On the contrary, thanks to 
its own tragic history, today’s Europe is very much aware of power— 
above all aware of the terrible temptations and dangers of unbalanced 
power.  Its natural bent is toward building a balanced concert of states to 
control power.  When faced with conflict— internal or external— 
Europe’s instinct is toward conciliation, toward finding common ground.  
It has grown skillful at focusing soft power to nudge contending parties 
into agreement.113   
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This divergence in how the United States and European Union countries perceive 
the role of military power in international affairs was expressed succinctly by Senator 
John Kyl (R-Arizona) in August 2002: 
At this point, allow me to step back from specific areas of disagreement 
with the Europeans to a more general one—the utility of power vs. 
diplomacy.  We all agree that both have their place; but it is probably true 
that the U.S. will resort to power more often than continental Europeans 
are disposed to do.  A corollary is that Americans probably have less 
confidence in treaties than do Europeans.114   
 
Furthermore, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of 
Government, discussed the important role that power of various types will continue to 
play in the transatlantic relationship: 
Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political 
ideals, and policies.  When U.S. policies appear legitimate in the eyes of 
others, American soft power is enhanced.  Hard power will always remain 
crucial in a world of nation-states guarding their independence, but soft 
power will become increasingly important in dealing with the 
transnational issues that require multilateral cooperation for their 
solution.115   
 
This gap in power contributes to what has been termed the “paradox of American 
power” in current world affairs. 
 
1. The “Paradox of American Power” 
 
However, this disparity in power and the important role that it plays in the 
Atlantic Alliance should not mask the fact that the United States faces a dilemma inherent 
in its current position.  The paradox of American power is that even a country as 
powerful as the United States can rarely act with total autonomy116.  At its heart, the 
dispute over the ICC between the United States and Europe reflects this paradox of power 
and its impact on each side’s view of international multilateral institutions.   
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Joseph S. Nye, Jr. argues that the current state of world affairs demonstrates this 
paradox of American power, and that it will have an impact on American foreign policy 
decision-making in the future: “In the absence of international institutions through which 
others can feel consulted and involved, the imperial imposition of values may neither 
attract others nor produce soft power…The paradox of American power is that world 
politics is changing in a way that makes it impossible for the strongest world power since 
Rome to achieve some of its most crucial international goals alone.”117  In his recent 
work The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It 
Alone, Nye expanded on the concept of this paradox in the current state of American 
power: 
As one sympathetic European correctly observed, “From the law of the 
seas to the Kyoto Protocol, from the biodiversity convention, from the 
extraterritorial application of the trade embargo against Cuba or Iran, from 
the brusk calls for reform of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund to the International Criminal Court: American 
unilateralism appears as an omnipresent syndrome pervading world 
politics.”118  
 
2. American Unilateralism vs. European Multilateralism 
 
This disparity in power between the United States and the rest of the world has 
led to characterization of American policy as strongly unilateralist, whereas European 
governments are more apt to seek multilateral solutions.  In his study Of Paradise and 
Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, Robert Kagan discusses common 
conceptions of both American and European foreign policies.  Kagan characterizes 
American policies in the following manner: 
The problem today, if it is a problem, is that the United States can “go it 
alone,” and it is hardly surprising that the American superpower should 
wish to preserve its ability to do so.  Geopolitical logic dictates that 
Americans have a less compelling interest than Europeans in upholding 
multilateralism as a universal principle for governing the behavior of 
nations.  Whether unilateral action is a good or a bad thing, Americans 
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objectively have more to lose from outlawing it than any other power in 
today’s unipolar world.119   
 
Kagan then described the contrasting nature of European foreign policies by 
highlighting his view that: 
Europe’s relative weakness has understandably produced a powerful 
European interest in building a world where military strength and hard 
power matter less than economic and soft power, an international order 
where international law and international institutions matter more than the 
power of individual nations, where unilateral action by powerful states is 
forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights 
and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of 
behavior.120 
 
However, lest one accept Kagan’s conclusion that “Americans are from Mars and 
Europeans are from Venus”121 as pre-ordained and begin writing the obituary of 
transatlantic relations, one should consider an insightful response to the Kagan thesis.  
Christopher J. Makins, President of the Washington, D.C.-based Atlantic Council of the 
United States, contends that  
Above all, there is a need to tone down the rhetoric of a public debate in 
which, in recent months, Europeans have accused Americans of being 
simplistic unilateralists and Americans have accused Europeans of being, 
at best, irrelevant wimps…The best interests of both sides lie in ensuring 
that those gaps of policy, and the underlying differences of interest and 
assessment, are not allowed to mask the greater similarities of interest.  
For the differences are not as large or as structural or as enduring as 
Kagan’s provocative article would have one believe.122   
 
Scholarly debate over the divergence between the United States and Europe 
highlights the importance of the ICC debate in European-American relations.  Stewart 
Patrick of New York University discusses the irony of American unilateralism: 
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The United States has never been very comfortable with the constraints 
and obligations of multilateralism.  Indeed, a hallmark of U.S. foreign 
relations is that the nation has been the world’s leading champion of 
multilateral cooperation and, paradoxically, one of the greatest 
impediments to such cooperation.  No other nation has done so much to 
create international institutions, yet few have been so ambivalent about 
multilateralism, so well positioned to obstruct it, or so tempted to act 
unilaterally.  This ambivalence reflects three features of the American 
experience: the nation’s singular political culture, its domestic institutional 
structure, and its global dominance.123 
 
Patrick then describes the American affinity for unilateral behavior under certain 
circumstances: 
U.S. officials also defend unilateralism in ethical terms, depicting it as a 
moral imperative transcending secondary international obligations; as the 
only means to remain true to U.S. identity and values; as a last resort, 
taken after exhaustive efforts to reach consensus; as a contribution to the 
general welfare rather than narrow U.S. interests; or as a form of 
leadership to overcome inertia, mobilize a coalition, create an international 
standard, or enforce an international agreement…In recent years, U.S. 
government officials have sometimes justified unilateral American action 
by invoking the country’s willingness to subsidize international security 
and run disproportionate risks for global stability.  In discharging its 
obligations as the ultimate custodian or guarantor of global order, they 
argue, the United States cannot afford to be hamstrung by rules and 
institutions binding on others.124   
 
Phillip H. Gordon of the Brookings Institution outlines the foundations of 
American and European identification with unilateral and multilateral policies, 
respectively: 
Finally, history, geography, and the power differential have left the two 
sides of the Atlantic with very different attitudes toward sovereignty—
clearly the source of all our recent disputes over “multilateral” issues such 
as arms control agreements, the United Nations, and the International 
Criminal Court.  A powerful United States with enormous freedom of 
action throughout the world feels little pressing interest in new 
mechanisms that might curb that freedom.  Europeans, on the other hand, 
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have spent 50 years gradually, and for some painfully and incompletely, 
getting used to the idea of living in an “international community” and 
accepting constraints on their sovereignty.  It is not surprising that smaller 
and weaker countries on a crowded continent are more interested in and 
find it easier to live with binding international laws and agreements than is 
the world’s sole superpower, which spans a vast continent.125   
 
Gordon’s insight highlights the deeper issue of sovereignty that is one of the 
foundations of the apparent divergence between unilateralist American and multilateralist 
European policies.  The United States is powerful and thus capable of defending its 
sovereignty more effectively than European countries that are generally more interested 
in pooling their sovereignty in multilateral institutions. To be sure, EU members have 
pooled sovereignty not primarily for defense purposes, but to advance shared political 
and economic objectives.   
One of the frustrating aspects of this controversy for Europeans has been the fact 
that the United States is such a strong supporter of multilateral institutions in theory, 
providing considerable leadership and assistance in their foundation, yet often chooses 
not to abide by their precepts and instead acts in a unilateral fashion.  Patrick discusses 
why the United States may choose to pursue unilateral policies, albeit often in defense of 
multilateral goals: 
Multilateral institutions are vulnerable to numerous pathologies, such as 
free riding, buck passing, glacial decision-making, and lowest common 
denominator policy-making…Given the shortcomings of multilateral 
institutions, as well as the gross asymmetries of power in the 
contemporary international system, robust American unilateral action may 
be ethically preferable to flaccid multilateralism, even when it violates 
international norms.  At times, unilateralism may actually advance the 
cause of multilateralism.126  
 
Yet perhaps nowhere are the elements of American behavior that Europeans find 
frustrating better illustrated than in the case of the United Nations Security Council vis-à-
vis the ICC. 
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3. The United Nations Security Council and Trans-Atlantic Relations 
 
This dispute has also concerned the role of the United Nations Security Council in 
the preservation of international peace and security.  The United States, given its 
permanent veto power on the Security Council, seeks a Court that is ultimately 
subordinate to the United Nations Security Council, and many European countries in 
weaker positions seek an ICC that is entirely independent of the veto power of the 
permanent United Nations Security Council members, and thus able to avoid what they 
consider undue coercion by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, or the United 
States. It is ironic that the United States has appealed to the need to uphold the authority 
of the United Nations Security Council to defend its opposition to the ICC, arguing that 
the United Nations Security Council and not the International Criminal Court is 
responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, yet has been remiss 
in paying its considerable dues to the organization.127  Moreover, the United States has 
chosen on occasion to use force without the explicit authorization of the UN Security 
Council, notably in the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when the NATO Allies—including ten EU 
members—conducted an air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
Thus, the United States government approaches the International Criminal Court 
from a position of considerable power, as a permanent veto-holding member of the 
United Nations Security Council and significant financial and military contributor to the 
organization.  The United States, by virtue of its military and diplomatic power, has a 
unique ability to pursue its objectives via the United Nations when it can gain the support 
of enough influential like-minded states, yet it also has the requisite hard power to be 
capable on occasion of acting outside the purview of the organization.   
European countries, on the other hand, place more faith in the United Nations as a 
guarantor of their positions in international affairs and view the ICC as another institution 
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capable of “leveling the playing field” among the nations of the world, including the 
United States.  This controversy thus concerns the United Nations Security Council and 
other international institutions within the fundamental context of the power relationship 
between the United States and Europe.  Thus, the dispute over the ICC reflects the 
disparity in power between the United States and European countries, the paradox of 
American power, and resulting characterizations of the United States as unilateralist and 
of European countries as multilateralist. Furthermore, this power disparity is best 
illustrated by the narrowly defined relationship between the ICC and the United Nations 
Security Council.128 
 
B. PARADOX OF MEANS VERSUS ENDS 
 
Another aspect of the divergence in European and American views on the ICC is 
that both sides agree on the importance of the principles and objectives at stake if not on 
how best to uphold them in practice.  As Joseph Nye notes, “Americans and Europeans 
share the values of democracy and human rights more thoroughly with each other than 
with any other region of the world.  As Ambassador Robert Blackwill has written, at the 
deepest level, neither the United States nor Europe threatens the vital or important 
interests of the other side.”129  Despite these common values, Europeans and American 
disagree on the appropriate method of furthering them.  According to Charles Kupchan,  
“Americans see the EU’s firm commitment to multilateral institutions and the rule of 
international law as naïve, self-righteous, and a product of its military weakness, while 
Europeans see America’s reliance on the use of force as simplistic, self-serving, and a 
product of its excessive power.”130   
Despite its early support for the ICC, the United States government generally 
believes that international justice is best served through reliance on strong national 
judicial systems, supported as necessary by ad hoc tribunals under United Nations 
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Security Council auspices, to ensure that appropriate checks and balances exist to guard 
against any unwarranted trespass on national sovereignty.  From the official American 
perspective, the International Criminal Court is an institution to be feared not for its 
intention to bring the world’s worst criminals to justice but for its potential for violations 
of traditional standards and fundamental principles of justice in the process. 
European Union governments generally contend that international law and justice 
can best be upheld by a world court with broad authority from whose jurisdiction no war 
criminal can escape.  From the European perspective, the Court is the embodiment of 
international law and justice and incorporates mechanisms sufficient to assuage American 
fears of the Court’s potential abuses of power. Americans criticize elements of the Court, 
such as the ICC’s prosecutor, deemed incapable of conforming to standards of the United 
States government’s political checks and balances, while Europeans endorse those very 
elements, arguing that the Court has safeguards against the assumption of undue 
prosecutorial authority and that the prosecutor will be an individual of such character that 
any abuses would be unlikely.131  It is an ironic and likely frustrating circumstance for 
those who seek international justice that the United States and European Union 
governments agree on ends of international justice, the rule of law, and other goals of the 
ICC, but differ drastically on their preferred means of pursuing them.  Andrew Moravcsik 
of Harvard University has underscored the importance of the means favored by the 
United States and European Union countries, respectively: 
Europeans and Americans disagree about not only power and threats, but 
also means.  As Robert Kagan and other neoconservatives argue, U.S. 
military power begets an ideological tendency to use it.  In Europe, by 
contrast, weak militaries coexist with an aversion to war.  Influenced by 
social democratic ideas, the legacy of two world wars, and the EU 
experience, Europeans prefer to deal with problems through economic 
integration, foreign aid, and multilateral institutions.132  
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Moravcsik then highlights how the divergent views of Americans and Europeans 
on the preferred means of addressing international challenges co-exist with agreed goals 
and values on both sides of the Atlantic: 
In spite of these doubts about the Bush administration’s policies, however, 
underlying U.S. and European interests remain strikingly convergent.  It is 
a cliché but nonetheless accurate to assert that the Western relationship 
rests on shared values: democracy, human rights, open markets, and a 
measure of social justice.  No countries are more likely to agree on basic 
policy, and to have the power to do something about it.133   
 
Thus hope exists for a reconciliation of differences between Americans and 
Europeans, and exasperation over disagreements among countries with such similar 
values should be tempered by the knowledge that two continents whose developmental 
paths are so divergent have in fact disagreed fundamentally about relatively few issues of 
substance during their association since the late 1940s.  Notwithstanding variations in 
relative power, the United States and European Union countries disagree over the 
appropriate means of achieving the goals of the ICC due in part to their distinct strategic 
and diplomatic cultures.    
 
C. DIVERSITY IN STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC CULTURES 
 
The European-American dispute over the Court has also elicited generalizations 
about each side’s strategic and diplomatic cultures.  In this instance strategic and 
diplomatic culture refers to the system of beliefs and traditions by which a country 
defines its worldview and with which it develops its national and foreign policies.  
Charles Kupchan refers to cultural differences within the Atlantic Alliance when he 
asserts: “At root, America and Europe adhere to quite different political cultures.  And 
the cultural distance appears to be widening, not closing, putting the two sides of the 
Atlantic on diverging social paths.”134  These distinct cultures have shaped the responses 
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of the United States and European Union governments to the Court and the discussions 
that have followed over its emerging role vis-à-vis the current system of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
1. American Exceptionalism 
 
An important element of American strategic and diplomatic culture that bears on 
the ICC dispute is the American assumption of exceptionalism.  Professor Bertram S. 
Brown discusses the American perspective: 
For some, the logic of U.S. indispensability justifies U.S. exceptionalism: 
the idea that the United States should get special treatment and remain free 
from the legal restraints applied to other states.  According to this view it 
should retain absolute freedom of action, not only for its own sake but also 
for the sake of the international community, because in many cases only 
the United States has the power and the will to act when necessary.  This 
idea of exceptionalism has been invoked, directly or indirectly, as a 
justification for U.S. objections to the ICC statute.135   
 
Stewart Patrick has outlined his view of American exceptionalism: 
As international institutions grow and become more active, some 
Americans perceive U.S. political institutions, domestic law, and 
constitutional traditions to be besieged by undemocratic and 
unaccountable organs of global governance.  They worry that international 
rules and bodies will lack domestic standards of transparency, usurp the 
authority of the people’s elected representatives, and open domestic 
institutions and private enterprises to unwarranted external scrutiny.  
Defenders of U.S. sovereignty espouse a doctrine of American 
exceptionalism; taking a rosy view of America’s past, they argue that its 
unique tradition of democracy and equality means that it does not have to 
be subject to international law.136   
 
David J. Bederman, in a summer 2001 article in the Emory Law Journal, noted: 
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That leaves the important question of constitutional constraints on U.S. 
participation in certain forms of international lawmaking institutions.  
These restrictions reflect the two essential characteristics of American 
constitutionalism: divided power and grants of individual liberty.  
American exceptionalism in attitudes towards the incorporation of 
international law values does embrace a healthy skepticism.  After all, this 
country has had a successful constitutional order for over two centuries, 
and we should not rush to incorporate newfangled and untested principles.  
Opponents of internationalism essentially make two broad-gauged attacks 
on the incorporation of international rules and participation in 
international institutions: (1) that to do so would compromise some 
federalism or separation of powers restriction; or (2) that it would violate a 
fundamental liberty interest of U.S. citizens.137   
 
Stewart Patrick has argued that the American culture of exceptionalism functions 
to harden American policy toward multilateral institutions that are perceived as 
threatening to the United States, which explains in part the U.S. objections to (a) the 
powers of the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor and (b) the sharply limited 
authority of the UN Security Council in relation to the ICC: 
On the other hand, exceptionalism also arouses a countervailing 
determination to preserve the unique values and institutions of the United 
States from corruption or dilution by foreign contact and a vigilance to 
defend U.S. national interests, sovereignty, and freedom of action against 
infringement by global rules and supranational bodies.  The United States 
remains a model for humanity in this view, but it must limit its global 
responsibilities and safeguard its internal and external freedoms.138 
 
D. POLITICAL TOOL WIELDED BY BOTH SIDES 
 
Another phenomenon evident in this dispute has been use of the Court as a 
political tool.  The United States and European Union governments have applied pressure 
regarding the ICC to aspiring entrants into international organizations.  The member 
states of the European Union have pressured countries aspiring to membership in the 
Union to support the Court and to refuse to make “Article 98” agreements with the 
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United States.  In contrast, the United States has applied pressure to aspiring entrants into 
NATO to make such agreements.  Consequently, many Eastern European countries, 
interested in gaining entry to both the European Union and NATO, find themselves 
caught between the persuasive power of the current member states of the European Union 
and the United States.  In August 2002 The Economist noted that “Central 
Europeans…have been caught in the middle of a growing and ill-tempered dispute 
between the United States and the European Union, with each side issuing veiled threats 
to penalise any country that fails to do its bidding.” 139  Thus, the use of the ICC in 
negotiations with aspiring members of the European “community” has been linked by 
some observers to the rhetoric of the current U.S. administration concerning the shift in 
focus from Western “Old Europe” toward Central and Eastern “New Europe,”140 
particularly in terms of the possible reorganization of U.S. military installations in 
Europe. Thus, ironically, the ICC has achieved political and symbolic significance that 
threatens to divert attention from the primary goals of the Court and the difficult legal 
challenges it faces. 
 
E. “TALKING PAST ONE ANOTHER” 
 
The dispute over implementation of common principles in practice has generated 
a situation in which the Americans and the Europeans seem to be “talking past one 
another” as they debate the validity of competing claims, many of which are matters of 
national perspective and defy thorough evaluation until the Court begins operation and 
develops its own body of case law.  For instance, the United States is asking states party 
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to the Rome Statute to respect its decision to remain outside of the Court’s framework,141 
whereas the European Union countries argue that the United States is threatening 
transatlantic relations and the Court by not supporting it.  The American position in this 
regard was articulated by Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs 
Otto J. Reich in a September 2002 speech: 
We respect the right of other nations to become parties to the treaty, but 
ask that other countries respect our right not to do so…The United States 
will continue to be a forceful advocate for the principle that there must be 
accountability for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.  Our 
policy on the ICC is consistent with other long-standing policies on human 
rights, the rule of law and the validity of democratic institutions.142   
 
This “talking past one another” phenomenon is also apparent in the 
aforementioned controversy over Article 98 agreements, since the United States holds 
that such agreements are consistent with the Rome Statute while opponents charge that 
they are contrary to the Statute and its intent.   In a July 2002 speech in Brussels, Chris 
Patten, then the EU Commissioner for External Relations, captured the essence of the EU 
perspective with regard to the irony of the U.S. position: “To see the International 
Criminal Court as an assault on the United States is, frankly, perverse.  The court’s 
purpose, rather, is one that the United States wholeheartedly shares: to ensure that 
genocide and other such crimes against humanity should no longer go unpunished.”143   
Yet perhaps the clearest example of the perplexing ability of the two sides to view 
the same treaty from totally different viewpoints and make statements that seem “oceans 
apart” appeared in remarks made at the 12 June 2003 meeting of the United Nations 
Security Council in New York.  In a discussion of the renewal of UNSC resolution 1422 
(2002) regarding exemptions from ICC jurisdiction for U.N. peacekeepers, Ambassador 
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Adamantios Th. Vassilakis, Permanent Representative of Greece to the U.N., represented 
the European Union and made the following assertion: 
The European Union reiterates its belief that the concerns expressed by the 
United States about politically motivated prosecutions are unfounded, 
since those concerns have been met and sufficient safeguards against such 
prosecutions have been built into the Statute…Furthermore, the Statute 
incorporates the principle of complementarity, which places the primary 
responsibility for investigation and prosecution with domestic 
jurisdictions.  The Court may assume responsibility as a last resort only 
when a State is unable or unwilling to do so.144   
  
Despite such assurances, U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham, Deputy United 
States Representative to the United Nations, noted that “The ICC is vulnerable at every 
stage of any proceeding to politicization.  The Rome Statute provides no adequate check.  
Having every confidence in the ICC’s correct behaviour, however that is defined, is not 
in our view a safeguard.”145  
Thus, whatever the text of the Rome Statute may prescribe, and whether the 
principle of complementarity would in fact ensure that only a gross mishandling of 
justice in the U.S. domestic legal system would lead to indictment of a U.S. citizen by the 
ICC, it is the U.S. interpretation of the Court’s potential for abuse that matters in the 
formulation of U.S. policy.  Hence, Europeans and other ICC supporters can argue that 
sufficient safeguards exist within the treaty, or that in reality a nation as powerful as the 
United States would never need to worry about an “unjust” proceeding being carried out 
against one of its citizens; but as long as the leaders of the United States perceive that 
there is a chance, however remote, of a politicized or unfair trial, then tension will remain 
and disputes such as those over U.N. peacekeeping exemptions, Article 98 agreements, 
and the ASPA will continue.  Given this circumstance, the ICC is not only about 
international law in its specific codifications but also about the conflict between two 
competing interpretations of the role of international institutions and power relationships.  
This is an unfortunate result, indeed, yet one that must be understood by any observer of 
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this disagreement in order to avoid unfair criticism of the United States as a nation that 
does not uphold the ideals of international justice or of European Union countries as not 




The dispute between the United States and European Union countries highlights 
an intriguing disparity between principles and practice, the use of the Court as a political 
tool, and the Court’s symbolic status in trans-Atlantic relations.  The unique strategic and 
diplomatic cultures of each side, the power disparity between the United States and 
Europe, and the concept of American exceptionalism in light of European and American 
historical development have all combined to make the ICC issue highly politicized, 
symbolic of the deeper differences among Americans and Europeans, and illustrative of 
the paradox wherein both sides agree on the noble ends of international justice sought yet 
part ways on the appropriate means of achieving them.  The symbolic and politicized 
nature of this dispute and the disparity between principles and practice have the potential 
to breed confusion, frustration, and resentment, all of which have important implications 
for the Court and transatlantic relations. 
Given the Court’s symbolic importance in current U.S.-European relations, this 
issue has become yet another source of tension across the Atlantic among allies and 
economic partners that already have differing conceptions of whether the use of military 
force in Iraq was justified, appropriate methods to be employed in the global war on 
terrorism, international peacekeeping operations, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the burden 
sharing debate, and the proper role of military force in international relations.  That the 
ICC is such a powerful symbol of the current rift in transatlantic relations ensures that it 
will continue to play an important role in European-American relations, not only because 
of the yearly controversy over extension of the U.N. peacekeeping exemption but also 
because of the essential transatlantic issues it represents. 
Finally, it should be noted that disputes of this sort are certainly nothing new 
among members of the Atlantic Alliance.  Throughout the Cold War, European allies 
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disagreed with the United States over a range of specific issues despite their close 
strategic and diplomatic partnerships.  In a similar fashion, the reluctance of the United 
States to ratify certain international treaties despite significant influence in their drafting, 
as well as the post-Cold War debates over burden sharing and emerging security and 
defense roles for the European Union are illustrative of this rift in European-American 
relations.  Nonetheless, the implications of the withdrawal of the U.S. signature to the 
Rome Statute and the resulting dispute between the United States and European Union 

























V- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The decision by the United States, a traditional advocate of international law and 
jurisprudence and pioneer in the establishment of war crimes tribunals, not to adhere to 
the Rome Statute has raised questions about the Court’s validity and the future of 
international law in this domain.  Criticisms by America’s detractors notwithstanding, the 
United States withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute on principled grounds.  The 
United States and European Union governments must evaluate various prospects for the 
future and tailor their policies accordingly if the objectives of the Court are to be 
achieved and positive transatlantic relations are to be maintained. 
This chapter discusses various scenarios for the development of the Court, 
corresponding implications for the transatlantic relationship, and recommendations for 
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to aid their governments in weathering the 
storm of allied controversy.  The scenarios include diverse prospects for the Court, U.S. 
policy toward the Court, the role of the ICC as a divisive or unifying influence on 
member states of the European community, and the linkage of the ICC to other critical 
issues in transatlantic relations.  The thesis also examines a plausible synthesis of these 





1. Scenario #1- ICC Failure 
 
 The ICC could be a failure, either for want of American economic, political, and 
diplomatic leadership or as a result of a disastrous early trial.  Since the states party to the 
Rome Statute appear determined to pursue the establishment of a fully functioning court, 
the absence of the United States, though costly and likely to complicate the ICC’s 
operations, will probably not doom the ICC.  However, a fully constituted Court will face 
challenges common to past criminal tribunals, including extradition of accused persons to 
appear before the Court, enforcement of sentences, and the problematic matter of 
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deterring future crimes.  The Court must contend with further criticism and uncertainty 
during the time that may elapse before its first trial.  However, a controversial or poorly 
managed initial trial could impede the Court’s development or precipitate its demise.   
The ICC will be competing against the odds in its initial stages, as Princeton 
University’s Gary Bass concedes: 
At a minimum, long-run deterrence of war crimes would require a 
relatively credible threat of prosecution: that is, a series of successful war 
crimes tribunals that became so much an expected part of international 
affairs that no potential mass murderer could confidently say that he 
would avoid punishment.  The world would have to set up tribunals 
significantly more intimidating than the UN’s two current courts for ex-
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  The proposed ICC would likely help, but only if 
it somehow receives political support from the same great powers who 
have largely neglected the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals for so 
long.146   
 
If the ICC were unsuccessful, some of the concerns and reservations of the United 
States about the Court would be validated, and European Union states would find 
themselves under increased diplomatic pressure, at a time when some European nations 
are already feeling the effects of having opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March-
April 2003. 
 
2. Scenario #2- ICC Success 
 
Conversely, the Court might be successful, an outcome that may actually be more 
likely if the states party to the Rome Statute are motivated by American objections to 
redouble their efforts to ensure the Court’s effective functioning.  These states would be 
wise to heed the advice of Professor Bass: “If there is to be, despite American objections, 
a serious permanent war crimes tribunal—the ICC—then liberal governments will have 
to make a far stronger commitment to international justice than they have in the 
1990s.”147  A successful debut would vindicate ICC supporters, validate the position of 
the European Union governments party to the Rome Statute, and put pressure on the 
                                                 
146Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 295. 
147Ibid., 282. 
69 
United States to re-examine its reservations.  Additionally, this outcome could precipitate 
re-evaluation of the validity of other U.S. foreign policy initiatives and undermine the 
legitimacy of American efforts to promote international law via United Nations Security 
Council-chartered ad hoc war crimes tribunals.  If the Court brought some prominent 
international criminal to justice, the United States might consider a thorough re-
examination of its policy vis-à-vis the ICC, possibly choosing to adhere to it in the future.  
However, the effectiveness of the Court could be impeded by disagreements between the 
United States and its partners in the European Union.  As The Economist noted on 29 
June 2002: “Kyoto and the international court have, in effect, become the two most 
powerful witnesses deployed in the anti-Americans’ case, especially in Europe: look, the 
critics are able to say, the United States is in favour of pollution and against justice.” 148  
The states party to the ICC hold that they must work to ensure continued broad support 
for the Court, despite opposition from the United States. 
A powerful ICC could, however, threaten the legitimacy of the United Nations 
Security Council.149  Though supporters of the Court such as the non-governmental 
organization Human Rights Watch refer to the oversight of the Security Council as a 
“safeguarding”150 measure against potential abuses, the Rome Statute may actually 
delegitimize the United Nations and its Security Council veto system, as John Bolton has 
observed: 
Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.  The ICC’s efforts 
could easily conflict with the Council’s work…In requiring an affirmative 
Council vote to stop a case, the Statute shifts the balance of authority from 
the Council to the ICC.  Moreover, a veto by a Permanent Member of such 
a restraining Council resolution leaves the ICC completely 
unsupervised.151   
                                                 
148 “Present at the Creation: A Survey of America’s World Role,” The Economist, 29 June 2002, 24. 
149 The legitimacy of the U.N. Security Council system (particularly the permanent veto power) and the 
effectiveness of many U.N. programs may be debatable, but hampering the United Nations needlessly 
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150 “Finally, the U.N. Security Council can adopt a resolution suspending the ICC from investigating or 
prosecuting any case.” - Human Rights Watch: “Myths and Facts About the International Criminal Court.” 
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151 “The United States and the International Criminal Court: John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms 
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Furthermore, an ICC capable of superseding the authority of the United Nations 
would negatively affect the world body: 
This attempted marginalization of the Security Council is a fundamental 
new problem created by the ICC that will have a tangible and highly 
detrimental impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.  The Council 
now risks having the ICC interfere in its ongoing work, with all of the 
attendant confusion between the appropriate roles of law, politics, and 
power in settling international disputes.152   
 
This result is particularly worrisome given the current involvement of the United 
Nations in fifteen peacekeeping operations worldwide, with 34,941 military personnel 
and civilian police serving from eighty-nine countries.153  Such a challenge to the 
authority of the United Nations could be detrimental to millions of people around the 
world who benefit from its institutions and programs.   
In addition to threatening the legitimacy and effectiveness of the United Nations, 
the ICC could undermine current efforts to punish war criminals and prevent the most 
heinous of international crimes.  Establishment of the Court may lull supporters into a 
false sense of security whereby they assume that the task of bringing the world’s worst 
criminals to justice has been fulfilled by virtue of creating an institution with broadly 
stated powers.  The criminals of tomorrow may be persuaded that they can act with 
impunity and challenge the Court to bring them to justice; and past criminals may assume 
that their crimes will go unpunished, since the Court’s jurisdiction is not retroactive.154   
Responsible governments must not become complacent in their fight against 
crimes of such magnitude, nor allow the Court to overshadow other judicial experiments 
like the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  Each of 
these institutions must be supported and strengthened in the future, and the ICC 
(particularly if it benefited from revisions in the Rome Statute that would deal with U.S. 
                                                 
152John R. Bolton, “Courting Danger: What’s Wrong With the International Criminal Court,” The 
National Interest (Winter 1998/99): 68; italics in the original. 
153Figures current for 31 May 2003:  Background Note: 18 June 2003- “United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations.” [http://www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf]. Accessed 4 August 2003. 
154“..its jurisdiction begins when the ICC Treaty enters into force..”- Human Rights Watch: “Myths and 
Facts About the International Criminal Court.” [http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/facts.htm]. Accessed 22 
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reservations) could complement these bodies and those that follow in order to achieve its 
goals of promoting international justice.  Additionally, even a Court successful in 
punishing international criminals would not wish to allow such success to hamper its 
efforts in the more daunting task of seeking true deterrence for such crimes.  Professor 
Bass commented on this challenge as follows: 
Had the West managed to summon the political will to stop the slaughters 
in Rwanda and Bosnia, there would have been no need for these two 
fragile experiments in international justice.  No war crimes, no war crimes 
tribunals.  But having abdicated the responsibility of stopping war crimes, 
the West has now put its faith in weak international institutions to restore 
the world community’s good name…Legalism will never make up for the 
lives lost; but legalism is all we have now.155 
 
The fundamental debate about effective deterrence for crimes of this magnitude 
notwithstanding, the Court’s supporters must be mindful of its unproven status and not 
discount national, “grass roots” measures, such as South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,156 as a means of achieving justice and preventing future 
crimes.  Only integrated and complementary efforts offer a credible hope of long-term 
success. 
 
3. Scenario #3- ICC Fadeaway 
 
In a third scenario, the International Criminal Court could fade from the realm of 
diplomatic discussions among the United States and its European partners, essentially 
becoming a “non-issue.”  U.S. influence could induce other states to examine the treaty 
text more closely, raising the possibility of (a) additional withdrawals if provisions of the 
Statute are found unsatisfactory, and (b) countries not yet party to the Statute choosing 
not to adhere to it.  However, despite the U.S. absence from the Court and diplomatic 
pressure from Washington, one-hundred thirty-nine countries have signed the Statute and 
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of those ninety-one have ratified it.157  Organizations such as the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, “USA for the ICC,” Human Rights Watch, and others 
continue to promote the Court and generate awareness worldwide. 
 
4. Scenario #4- U.S. Policy Reversal 
 
In a fourth scenario, the United States could reverse policy and sign the 1998 
Rome Statute, creating the possibility of Senate consideration for advice and consent.  
This scenario is conceivable given a change of presidential administration in 2004, or 
anytime thereafter.  Signature of the treaty without ratification would not in itself make 
the United States a party to the treaty, but would at least imply a general willingness to 
cooperate with the court, and an end to efforts to obstruct its functioning.  While the 
United States would remain subject to criticism for what some might perceive as a “half 
measure,” it seems likely that signing the Rome Statute, even without ratification, would 
diffuse at least some of the political tension that surrounds the Court.  Even given a 
change in the executive branch, however, ratification would remain unlikely, given 
widespread opposition in the Senate, which could probably not be reversed in a single 
election cycle.   
Future U.S. signature to the Rome Statute might also involve a quid pro quo 
among the United States and its allies, specifically the European members of NATO, 
whereby America would renew its signature to the Rome Statute in return for increased 
European support in peacekeeping operations in Iraq or increased European involvement 
in other key areas of American foreign policy.  In order for this scenario to be plausible, 
the benefit to the United States of allied cooperation on such foreign policy initiatives 
must outweigh the perceived risks of signing the treaty; for America’s allies, the benefit 
of an American signature to the Rome Statute must exceed the cost of cooperating with 
the United States or even condoning what some perceive as illegitimate U.S. actions, 
such as the use of force in Iraq in March-April 2003.  The complex diplomatic 
negotiations necessary for this scenario to take place make it speculative at best.   
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5. Scenario #5- ICC as a Divisive Influence in the EU 
 
The ICC could well become a divisive influence among members of the European 
Union.  Despite the European Union’s common policies, its decision to allow the 
negotiation by member countries of separate agreements with the United States—albeit 
under proscribed circumstances—and the recent statement of a common policy 
prohibiting negotiation of such Article 98 agreements with the United States could 
produce divisions among European countries over their degree of support for the Court 
and complicate defining a unified European position in the matter.  The ICC could also 
cause intra-European tensions to the degree that it led to further retrenchment of 
European military responsibilities, particularly in the realm of peacekeeping operations 
critical to the future of the Atlantic Alliance.  A critical example of this situation could be 
the withdrawal of major NATO troop contributors from the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.  Maintenance of the Anglo-American 
“special relationship” over European Union solidarity on the ICC could further isolate the 
United Kingdom from its European partners.  Tensions among current and prospective 
members of the European Union, particularly given competing pressures from the United 
States and European Union governments and the strongly pro-American views of most 
new NATO entrants, could threaten prospects for unity within the European Union.  This 
divisive influence could create a circumstance wherein various groups of European 
Union countries would align under common “issue alliances” of convenience on certain 
policies and make further EU common positions difficult to negotiate. 
 
6. Scenario #6- ICC as a Unifying Influence in the EU 
 
The Court could be a unifying force for the member states of the European Union 
as it expands its membership, revises its constitutional framework, and defines common 
policies.  This scenario is likely in light of previous common European Union policies 
such as those discussed in Chapter III.   However, this scenario envisions even stronger 
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unity among members of the European Union on the Court and united opposition to 
American efforts to negotiate Article 98 agreements.   
The ICC will be housed in The Hague, the Netherlands, and a united European 
Union capable of claiming a measure of ownership of the Court might increase the EU’s 
prestige worldwide.158  If the European Union united behind the common goal of 
promoting human rights and bringing war criminals to justice, it might present a 
significant counterweight to American efforts to promote justice via ad hoc United 
Nations Security Council-chartered war crimes tribunals and challenge the United States 
to negotiate its position with states party to the Rome Statute.   
 
7. Scenario #7- Status Quo Redux 
 
Given the complexity of European-American relations and the wide range of 
issues associated with the International Criminal Court, the most likely scenario for the 
future of the ICC vis-à-vis America and Europe may represent a synthesis of the 
aforementioned outcomes.  This scenario features continued American opposition to the 
Court and diplomatic pressure on aspiring NATO members to reject the ICC in return for 
U.S. support in their accession campaigns.  The United States might consider linking the 
ICC to other issues in trans-Atlantic relations, such as the command arrangements for 
troops in post-war Iraq or the military burden-sharing debate, in an attempt to promote 
wider opposition to the Court and achieve diplomatic leverage where possible.  Under 
this scenario Eastern and Central European countries may continue to negotiate separate 
immunity agreements with the United States, thus paving the way for possible 
disagreement among current and prospective members of the European Union over the 
Court, despite the official policies of the European Union.  The United States may 
contend with diplomatic resistance from partners in the European Union and NATO 
while memories of the withdrawal of the U.S. signature from the Rome Statute and the 
annual debate over renewal of exemptions for United Nations peacekeepers are fresh, a 
situation exacerbated by recent misgivings among European states about American 
unilateralism in general and the March-April 2003 intervention in Iraq in particular.  The 
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ICC’s first case, if successful, may vindicate its supporters and may isolate detractors, 
including the United States, even further.  However, an unsuccessful Court could breed 
discontent among European Union members, vindicate the objections of the United 
States, and strengthen relations between the United States and the European states that 
have been willing to conclude Article 98 agreements with Washington.159 
In this scenario, the United States must prepare for diplomatic disagreements with 
European allies as well as obstacles to the formation of future multilateral coalitions and 
perhaps additional difficulties in the functioning of international organizations.  The 
United States might benefit from stronger relations with newer entrants into NATO, 
including Eastern European and Baltic states.  European countries may have to accept 
U.S. opposition to the Court and the probability of continued debate over immunity for 
U.N. peacekeepers, and contend with U.S. pressure on prospective NATO entrants to 
accept U.S. views on ICC-related issues.  Additionally, European Union member states 
may find it fruitful to attempt to use whatever goodwill can be gained from negotiations 
on separate immunity agreements that satisfy U.S. concerns as leverage against the 
United States in future multilateral actions.160  Finally, in this scenario the ICC could be a 
resounding success if it tried a case against a major international criminal.  The Court 
could also be an unmitigated failure if its first trial was fraught with controversy and 
accusations of ineptitude.  The most likely scenario may represent not extreme 
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B. SUMMING UP THE SCENARIOS 
 
Though the Rome Statute has been widely ratified and entered into force in July 
2002, it has yet to prove its effectiveness in an actual trial, and the scenarios discussed 
above must be evaluated from this perspective.  The first cases heard by the Court will be 
decisive in determining its role in the future.  A controversial or unsuccessful initial trial 
could doom the Court, vindicate opponents like the United States, and reduce its political 
influence.  Should the Court fail because of one of the shortcomings identified by the 
United States, it would likely quell most criticism of the 2002 withdrawal of the U.S. 
signature and lead to a marginalization of the Court.  In this manner the ICC might be 
relegated to the list of well-intentioned measures promoting international peace and 
justice that either failed to meet high expectations or suffered from inadequate 
enforcement.  Just as the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Punishment and 
Prevention of Genocide, though promising in theory, has not prevented horrific atrocities 
during its existence in Cambodia, Iraq, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia because of 
practical difficulties in enforcement, so too the International Criminal Court may fail to 
perform effectively when faced with its initial case for reasons distinct from the U.S. 




What, then, are the practical implications of the European-American divergence?  
The impacts would seem to be relevant in four primary areas: for the ICC itself, the 
United States, European Union member states, and European countries currently likely to 
become involved in the dispute between the United States and the European Union.  Of 
particular importance are the implications of American measures since the May 2002 
withdrawal of the U.S. signature to the Rome Statue, namely the leading role in the 
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debates about U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1487 (2003) of the 
U.S. requirement for exemption from ICC jurisdiction, the pursuit of Article 98 
agreements, and the passage of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002.  
The summer 2003 debate over U.N. Resolution 1487, renewing exemptions from the 
ICC’s jurisdiction for “current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State 
not a Party to the Rome Statute”162 for a further twelve month period, generated strong 
reactions from supporters of the Court, including the Secretary General of the United 
Nations and the European Union, as highlighted in comments at a Security Council 
meeting on 12 June 2003, as noted in Chapters II and III of this thesis.   
Continued American pressure on countries to sign Article 98 agreements threatens 
to isolate the United States from its closest allies, particularly in Europe.  On 30 June 
2003 it was reported that: “The EU Presidency last week welcomed a declaration by the 
10 EU accession countries, and other associated states and EFTA countries, in which they 
affirmed the EU Common Position rejecting the U.S. bilateral immunity deals, and 
resolved that their national policies would adhere to that position.”163  Furthermore, in a 
30 June 2003 letter to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Human Rights Watch 
Executive Director Kenneth Roth stated: 
Whatever the administration thinks of the International Criminal Court, its 
tactics in pursuing these bilateral agreements are unconscionable.  Other 
governments can plainly see that punitive measures are being used 
primarily against poor and relatively weak states with few options other 
than to give in to the United States.  Signing an agreement will put an ICC 
state party in breach of its legal obligations and at odds with other 
important national interests.  This raw misuse of U.S. power makes the 
policy all the more objectionable.164 
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One of the implications of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 
became clear in July 2003 when the United States acted upon its decision to deny military 
assistance to countries that supported the Court and opposed U.S. policy.  On 2 July 
2003, the day after the United States “suspended military assistance to almost 50 
countries,” it was reported that “A U.S. official said that if countries had ratified the 
treaty setting up the international court and had not received a waiver, the ban on military 
aid would come into effect.  But the threat, enshrined in the American Service Members 
Protection Act of 2002, does not apply to the 19 NATO members and to nine ‘major non-
NATO allies.’”165  In his letter Kenneth Roth also asserted that “We are aware of many 
examples of American diplomats going far beyond the provisions of the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) to pressure small countries [to sign Article 98 
agreements]…Such demands on the part of the United States weaken support for the rule 
of law worldwide and respect for human rights.  They also deplete increasingly scarce 
U.S. diplomatic capital and credibility.”166   
The success of the International Criminal Court will ultimately be determined 
once it begins hearing cases and developing its own body of case law.  The U.S. decision 
not to adhere to the Rome Statute and instead to object strongly to the ICC’s high level of 
autonomy in relation to the U.N. Security Council and other aspects of the ICC may 
motivate the states party to the Court to increase their efforts to make it an effective 
institution.  The 13 May 2002 “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union” addressed the potential consequences of American opposition to the ICC for 
international law:  “While respecting the sovereign rights of the United States, the 
European Union notes that this unilateral action may have undesirable consequences on 
multilateral Treaty-making and generally on the rule of law in international relations.”167 
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The Court faces the prospect that realization of American fears, including that of 
the misuse of the power of the independent prosecutor and the ICC’s claims of universal 
jurisdiction, may weaken its legitimacy and vindicate U.S. opposition.  The Court may be 
challenged from the outset by the lack of support from American material and diplomatic 
resources and the intense diplomatic wrangling over its provisions, particularly within the 
transatlantic relationship. 
The ICC may chart a bold new course in international law as the world’s first 
permanent international court designed for the trial of individuals.  However, the Court 
must prove itself in an international judicial environment that features the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), respectively.  
The states party to the Rome Statute must ensure that the Court has the opportunity to 
justify its existence and demonstrate its capabilities and positive contributions to 
international law by 2009, the year in which (according to the Rome Statute) the Court 
can first be reviewed by its member states.  British barrister Geoffrey Robertson provided 
insight into the Court’s early prospects: “That means the ICC will not have American 
support until the Rome Statute is altered (e.g. by amending Article 16 so as to give 
permanent Security Council members a veto over prosecutions).  That cannot occur until 
the seven year review conference (in 2009)— the next chance to make the ICC’s 
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity truly universal.”168   
Furthermore, the dispute over the Court has implications for the historically 
intimate U.S.-European relationship.  At a time when the United States and certain 
European countries remain deeply divided about the legal and moral justifications with 
which the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was waged and in an era of 
increasingly asymmetric national security threats and rising demands for worldwide 
engagement in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, the United States and European 
states can ill afford to remain at odds over the Court.  The European Parliament has 
argued that transatlantic cooperation could have positive results for the Court: “[A] 
positive development of the transatlantic relations could reinforce the convergence 
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between the European Union and USA in the major values and objectives of democracy 
and the rule of law and should be done in the framework of a strong commitment in 
favour of a multilateral approach of the problems.”169  Human Rights Watch director 
Kenneth Roth alluded to the implications of U.S. actions regarding the ICC for the 
Atlantic Alliance in his 30 June 2003 letter to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell: 
U.S. diplomats have tried to blame the European Union’s support for the 
ICC as the cause of pressure many small countries feel in “choosing” 
between the United States and Europe.  It is clear, however, that the 
pressure is coming from the United States, since the European Union is 
not threatening punitive measures over the ICC.  These pressures are 
perceived as petty and mean-spirited by the U.S. government’s closest 
allies.  Indifference to this resentment is particularly counterproductive at 
a time when the U.S. is seeking global cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism.170 
 
Furthermore, the controversy over the ICC has implications within the broader 
context of current dilemmas challenging the historically warm transatlantic relationship.  
The quarrel over the ICC can be framed within the context of diplomatic disputes 
involving the proper role of the United Nations Security Council in international affairs, 
from the intense controversy surrounding the 1999 NATO air war against Kosovo to the 
debate over the use of force against Iraq in 2002-2003.  The ICC is also important in light 
of contention between Americans and Europeans over international treaties such as the 
Kyoto Protocols, the Ottawa Landmine Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  
The ICC dispute comes during a critical developmental period for future roles of 
humanitarian missions and peacekeeping responsibilities in the Middle East, Southwest 
Asia, the Balkans, and Africa.  Transatlantic divergence on the proper means of seeking 
justice for egregious international crimes and the appropriate use of military forces in 
challenging peacekeeping roles threatens the success of these regimes—to the possible 
detriment of millions—in the future.  Finally, the issue of the ICC and its attendant 
controversy concerning immunity for soldiers and prospects for bringing criminals to 
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justice threatens allied cohesion within the realm of the global campaign against 
terrorism. 
The Commissioner for External Relations of the European Union, Chris Patten, 
outlined the following implications of the U.S. position on the ICC: “More immediately, 
U.S. opposition to the ICC threatens international stability, because it poses practical 
problems for the renewal of U.N. peacekeeping mandates around the world.  The effects 
are already being felt in Bosnia.”171 Commissioner Patten’s remark was made days prior 
to the 12 July 2002 U.N. Security Council adoption of Resolution 1422(2002),172 when 
United States insistence on the exemption from ICC jurisdiction noted previously called 
into question the continuation of the U.N. mission in the Balkans.  Stewart Patrick noted 
the implications of the unilateralist tendency inherent in American policy toward the 
Court: 
Finally, perceived unilateralism may undermine American claims of 
benevolent hegemony, if foreign observers see the United States as 
pursuing policies without regard for their opinions, bypassing appropriate 
multilateral regimes, or holding itself above international norms… “The 
very weight of the Americans carries them toward hegemonism,” French 
foreign minister Hubert Vedrine has observed, “and the idea they have of 
their mission is unilateralism.  And that is unacceptable.”173  
 
Patrick outlined further implications in a 2003 article in Ethics & International 
Affairs: 
According to the German jurist Nico Krisch, the U.S. government 
frequently takes the lead in creating and shaping international law for 
other states, while itself insisting on remaining ‘exempt from or even, as 
far as possible, above’ these rules.  The implication is that the United 
States should be able to use international law to discipline others but not 
be disciplined by it…In the case of the Rome Statute, which does not 
                                                 
171 “The EU’s Human rights & Democratisation Policy: ‘Why Does America Fear this  
Court?”, by Chris Patten- Tuesday, 9 July 2002.” 
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/news/ip02_1023.htm]. Accessed 22 November 
2002. 
172 “United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1422 (2002): Adopted by the Security  
Council at its 4572nd meeting, on 12 July 2002.”  
[http://odsddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/477/61/PDF/N0247761.pdf?OpenElement]. Accessed 11 
March 2003. 
173 Stewart Patrick, “Don’t fence me in.” World Policy Journal, New York: Fall 2001.  Available from 
[http://proquest.umi.com/]. Accessed 21 June 2003. 
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permit reservations, and which the United States has not ratified, the Bush 
administration insisted in June 2002 that the UN Security Council 
guarantee that Americans participating in peacekeeping missions be 
granted immunity from ICC prosecution.  European diplomats perceived 
this demand for a privileged status as a blow to the very concept of a 
universal international legal system.174  
 
Charles A. Kupchan of Georgetown University highlighted more ominous 
impacts that he considers likely for international institutions in the wake of European-
American divergence over the International Criminal Court:  “This divergence over 
values as well as interests is likely to deal a serious blow to the effectiveness of 
international organizations.  Most multilateral institutions currently rely on a combination 





Given the likely implications of this dispute outlined above, various 
recommendations are in order for the United States, European Union member states, and 
other European countries involved with or likely to be affected by this matter.  The states 
party to the Rome Statute are likely to make concerted efforts to counter the absence of 
American moral and financial support while promoting the ICC and striving to establish 
its credibility despite American objections and the controversy raised by the withdrawal 
of the U.S. signature.  These states should seek to formulate common positions in this 
regard and to negotiate the best possible “middle road” of negotiating with the United 
States about its areas of concern while not fundamentally undermining the Rome Statute. 
The United States government should be more cognizant of the current and 
potential implications of its policy towards the Court and recent actions such as the 
suspension of military aid and continued pressure to secure bilateral immunity 
                                                 
174 Stewart Patrick, “Beyond coalitions of the willing: Assessing U.S. multilateralism.” Ethics & 
International Affairs. Vol. #17, no. 1, New York: 2003.  Available from  [http://proquest.umi.com/]. 
Accessed 21 June 2003. 
175 Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 
Twenty-first Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 157. 
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agreements.  Thus, the United States and the European Union should avoid excessive 
pressure on European candidates for EU and NATO membership, instead recognizing the 
difficult choices many of these countries face. 
The member states of the European Union will likely remain united in their 
common position toward the Court and toward American policies in this regard.  These 
states must realize that they probably cannot change American policies toward the Court 
or toward those countries that support the ICC.  As suggested above, the European Union 
must also avoid excessive pressure on prospective EU and NATO members. 
Finally, the European states most subject to pressures from the United States and 
the European Union must define their policies toward the ICC based on their respective 
national interests and then state those policies clearly so as to avoid, to the maximum 
degree possible, unnecessary misunderstanding or resentment among what are, after all, 
partners with enduring common interests far beyond those involved in the Rome Statute. 
The implications for the Court and the transatlantic relationship addressed above 
highlight certain potential pitfalls that both sides must avoid.  The United States and 
European Union governments must not allow their dispute over the ICC to obscure the 
Court’s true intent of prosecuting the world’s worst criminals.  Additionally, the United 
States should give credit, to the extent that this is justified, to the Statute’s incorporated 
“safeguards” to prevent abuses and to European efforts to alleviate American concerns, 
while the Europeans must avoid trivializing American reservations.  Finally, states party 
to the Rome Statute must do everything in their power to prevent the U.S.-European 
dispute from impeding the Court’s functions, rather resolving to demonstrate what the 
Court can accomplish.   
The United States must also determine whether European efforts to “alleviate” 
American concerns represent legitimate attempts to seek compromise on the Court or 
rather conciliatory language intended to make the Americans “feel better,” and therefore 
serve European interests by trying to appear to be solving the problems identified by the 
United States. 
Therefore, the wisest course of action for the United States is to pursue its goals in 
international law and justice within the framework of the United Nations Charter, while 
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closely scrutinizing the development of the Court.  The United States should examine the 
progress of the Court and state this intention publicly, in order to temper the ill-will 
harbored by many who oppose the withdrawal of the U.S. signature from the Rome 
Statute.  Professor Ruth Wedgwood’s 1998 recommendation could still benefit American 
policy today: 
In fact, allowing the ICC to mature independently while formally 
remaining outside the treaty structure is one good way for the United 
States to hedge its bets while maintaining NATO unity and exercising 
military leadership.  The United States can watch the court take shape 
before deciding whether to join.  If the court handles its work in a just and 
fair manner, free from political bias, only then need Washington consider 
signing up.176   
 
Complementing this cautious and prudent approach, the United States should also 
consider Henry Kissinger’s advice about interim steps toward achieving international 
justice: 
Until then, the United States should go no further toward a more formal 
system than one containing the following provisions:  
• The U.N. Security Council would create a Human Rights Commission 
or a special subcommittee to report whenever systematic human rights 
violations seem to warrant judicial action.  
• When the government under which the alleged crime occurred is not 
authentically representative, or where the domestic judicial system is 
incapable of sitting in judgement on the crime, the Security Council 
would set up an ad hoc international tribunal on the model of those of 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda.   
• The procedures for these international tribunals as well as the scope of 
the prosecution should be precisely defined by the Security Council, 
and the accused should be entitled to the due process safeguards 
accorded in common law jurisdictions.177 
 
This approach would allow the United States to remain actively engaged in this 
branch of international law, temper criticism of its policies, and provide it with a range of 
policy options as the Court develops.  
                                                  
176Ruth Wedgwood, “Fiddling in Rome,” Foreign Affairs (November/ December 1998): 24. 
177 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century 




The United States and the states of the European Union178 have played central 
roles in the development of concepts, institutions, and practices of international law.  The 
United States has one of the most highly developed legal systems in the world and the 
European Union the most effective system of supranational law among a group of 
sovereign states.  Each of these entities seeks justice for the perpetrators of the world’s 
most heinous crimes, among them war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.  
Yet the United States and the European Union view the world’s latest experiment in 
international law, the International Criminal Court, quite differently.  While the members 
of the European Union unanimously support the Court, the United States opposes it on 
the grounds that it could threaten basic American legal and constitutional principles, 
present unique threats to American sovereignty and to U.S. military and civilian officials, 
and place undue obstacles in the way of fulfilling America’s demanding global 
commitments.  In addition to the legal issues at stake, the European-American 
controversy over the Court illustrates the role of power in international relations and 
symbolizes differing attitudes on the two sides of the North Atlantic Ocean.     
This concluding chapter examines the major research questions of this thesis and 
the major arguments as well as the implications and subsequent recommendations for the 
United States and the European Union.  Finally, this chapter ventures independent 
conclusions and suggests areas for further research. 
 
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The primary research question investigated in this thesis was why the policies of 
the United States and European Union governments have caused such controversy within 
the transatlantic relationship.  The thesis concludes that the policies of the United States 
and the European Union have clashed because of the U.S. government’s May 2002 
                                                 
178 The member states of the European Union made significant contributions to international law well 
before its establishment. 
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decision to withdraw the U.S. signature from the Rome Statute and to renounce all 
obligations to the ICC, despite strong EU support for the Court.  
Secondly, what are the main areas of dispute between the two sides, and what are 
their foundations in the text of the 1998 Rome Statute?  The main areas of dispute stem 
from U.S. objections to the Court and suspicions about the potential abuse of its powers 
in relation to the U.N. Charter and American constitutional, governmental, and legal 
practices. Indeed, the issues central to this dispute include national power, sovereignty, 
protection of military personnel, United Nations peacekeeping, and national jurisdiction 
in extradition cases.  Of critical concern to the United States are Article 42(1) of the 
Rome Statute, dealing with the Prosecutor; Article 27(1), concerning official capacity; 
Article 16, referring to the role of the U.N. Security Council in ICC investigations; and 
Article 98(2), dealing with surrender agreements.  This dispute has also increased in 
intensity as a result of American pressure for exemptions from ICC jurisdiction for U.S. 
peacekeepers in Bosnia via U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1487 
(2003), U.S. attempts to secure bilateral “Article 98 agreements,” and passage of the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002.   
Thirdly, what are the merits of each side’s arguments about the Rome Statute and 
about the policies of the other side?  This question touches the heart of this transatlantic 
dispute, as experts and leaders in the United States and European Union countries make 
competing claims about the projected operation of the Court.  As described in Chapter 
IV, the two sides often appear to be “talking past one another.”  American experts have 
criticized elements of the ICC while European experts have argued that the American 
fears are unjustified, that the Rome Statute contains sufficient safeguards, and that the 
unique position of the United States makes any projected negative eventualities unlikely.   
In addition, how has this controversy affected U.S.-European relations?  This 
controversy has been one in a series of debates between the United States and European 
Union countries over the efficacy of international multilateral institutions.  The dispute 
over the International Criminal Court has been invested with a tremendous amount of 
symbolic significance, but both sides should be able to temper any negative consequences 
of the controversy through concerted efforts to reach diplomatic solutions.   
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Finally, what are the likely implications of this dispute for the International 
Criminal Court in the future and for the future of the transatlantic relationship, and what 
can be done by both sides to alleviate tensions and resolve contentious issues?  The 
implications and recommendations are reviewed below.   
 
B. MAJOR ARGUMENTS OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis has examined the official policies of the United States and European 
Union governments and their foundations in national policies and international legal 
traditions.  It initially addressed U.S. perceptions of the Court, analyzing specific 
American reservations about the Court and stated reasons for the U.S. withdrawal of 
signatory status on 6 May 2002.  U.S. policy toward the Court can be traced to American 
legal and constitutional traditions.  European Union perceptions of the ICC, including 
strong support for the Court, have their foundations in the emerging tradition of the EU’s 
supranational legal and governmental institutions. 
The thesis then evaluated what the differences in views of the Court indicate 
about the current status of European-American relations.  It considered the extent to 
which these differing interpretations signify divergent European and American views and 
increase the likelihood of further diplomatic and political disagreements in trans-Atlantic 
relations.  Furthermore, it examined the political and symbolic nature of the dispute over 
the Court and resulting characterizations of American and European policies as 
unilateralist and multilateralist, respectively.  It then outlined the implications of this 
disagreement for the future of transatlantic relations and European and American 
responses to international events and crises.  This section discussed the importance of the 
growing rift between America and Europe in the context of the military intervention in 
Iraq and continuing peacekeeping commitments in the Balkans and elsewhere, and with 
regard to future multilateral military and humanitarian interventions.   
The thesis also posited various implications for those involved in this dispute.  
UNSC resolutions 1422 and 1487 represent the results of America’s pressure to secure 
exemptions for its personnel.  It is possible that continued American pressure for bilateral 
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“Article 98 agreements” may further isolate the United States from its allies, and the 
United States may face diplomatic repercussions for cutting off military aid to certain 
countries in accordance with the provisions of the ASPA.  The untested nature of the ICC 
makes it vulnerable to criticism before it has developed a body of case law.  The 
realization of American reservations about the Court would call its legitimacy into 
question, and controversy between the United States and the European Union could 
threaten the continued efficacy of international institutions and critical humanitarian and 
peacekeeping efforts.   
Finally, certain recommendations were made for all associated with the 
transatlantic controversy over the ICC.  Given that the states party to the Rome Statute 
support the Court fully, the U.S. government must increase its awareness of the effects of 
its policy decisions in this regard and give due recognition to EU efforts to reach 
workable compromises.  In supporting the Court the EU must avoid undue pressure on 
aspiring EU and NATO entrants.  Additionally, European states caught between the 
United States and the European Union in this dispute must define and state their policies 
independently to mitigate external pressures.  The United States should closely scrutinize 
the operation of the Court, weigh the diplomatic risks of its current policies toward the 
Court and states party to it, and continue its efforts to promote the alternative of UN 
Security Council-chartered tribunals.  Most importantly, both the United States and the 
European Union should make every effort to prevent their dispute over the Court from 
obscuring its true purpose and the critical and continuing search for more effective 




Finally, what can one conclude about the probable effect of the ICC controversy 
on the future of European-American relations?  Several conclusions are in order. 
First, it is likely that the United States will continue to take whatever measures are 
necessary to protect its military and civilian personnel from the Court’s jurisdiction, and 
it is thus also unlikely that the United States will reconsider adhering to the Rome Statute 
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in the foreseeable future.  Second, it is likely that continued American actions to defend 
U.S. interests in this matter will strengthen European Union opposition to American 
policies.   
Given these two outcomes, the effects on other European states seeking 
membership in NATO and the European Union are unclear.  With concerted effort by 
both the United States and the European Union, an arrangement prominent in American 
rhetoric—that of countries respecting the U.S. decision not to be bound by the Rome 
Statute just as America respects the wishes of other states to be so bound—may be 
reached.  Thus, with disagreement over the Court but détente in terms of not allowing 
such divergence to degrade transatlantic relations, perhaps both sides can avoid undue 
pressure on European candidates for NATO and EU membership while continuing to 
work together on other critical judicial pursuits.  Disagreement over the ICC need not 
endanger European-American cooperation with respect to the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda or future tribunals chartered by the 
United Nations Security Council.   
Thirdly, it would be wise for both the United States and the European Union to 
emphasize the importance of studying the other’s position on the Court and associated 
issues.  In this manner, the views of each side about the Court and its associated issues 
can be better understood by the other side.  Experts in the United States and European 
Union countries can begin addressing each other’s concerns more substantively, thus 
increasing the likelihood of alleviating some areas of contention and at a minimum 
ensuring that controversy over the International Criminal Court will not do permanent 
damage to trans-Atlantic relations.   
Concerning American efforts to secure immunity for U.S. personnel serving as 
United Nations peacekeepers, it is reasonable to expect that an annual request for 
exemption from ICC jurisdiction will be made by the United States, and that this request 
may perpetuate or even exacerbate negative opinions of U.S. policy and continue to be a 
source of tension in U.S.-EU relations.  Given the important roles American forces play 
in U.N. missions, disagreement over this issue is likely to continue as each side 
vigorously champions its respective cause.   
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Furthermore, the continued U.S. attempts to conclude bilateral Article 98 
immunity agreements constitute an excellent example of the type of American 
“stubbornness”—firmness and consistency in the eyes of the U.S. government—in 
pursuing an independent policy toward the Court that has been inflammatory among 
America’s closest European Union partners.  The American Servicemembers’ Protection 
Act of 2002 is another controversial aspect of this dispute.  Though it is highly unlikely 
that extreme measures such as the use of force to repatriate an American citizen detained 
by the Court would ever be undertaken against a sovereign European state (the 
Netherlands), it is nonetheless already clear that the United States will act to defend its 
interests.  America’s defense of its “national interests” under this law has already cost 
certain nations U.S. military aid, and this could create resentments among those denied 
aid. Though the U.S. policy has been criticized by supporters of the ICC, the current 
administration has expressed  consistent opposition to the Court, with the request that 
other states respect that policy.  Despite accusations that the United States has engaged in 
“strong-arm tactics,” it should be noted that the United States has stayed the course in this 
matter.  Substantial American contributions to international justice, including support for 
ad hoc UN Security Council-chartered tribunals, should not be dismissed. 
From the European Union’s perspective there is little that can realistically be done 
to oppose the annual U.S. efforts to obtain exemption for U.S. personnel serving as UN 
peacekeepers, given the significant role played by the United States in such missions, 
particularly in the Balkans.  Nonetheless, criticism of U.S. policy by the European Union 
will likely continue, even as the EU accepts the American position and attempts to meet 
U.S. demands whenever possible.  Concerning Article 98 agreements, the shift in EU 
policy from partial accommodation (allowing members to conclude independent bilateral 
agreements, though subject to certain restrictions) to open opposition to American efforts 
to conclude such agreements reflects the important impact of American diplomacy since 
the May 2002 withdrawal of the U.S. signature to the Rome Statute.  The United States 
should consider this shift in EU policy carefully and evaluate the degree to which 
continued unilateral actions in this regard may crystallize opposition to the American 
position among increasing numbers of European states. 
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Finally, based on the scenarios outlined previously, the governments of the United 
States and the European Union should consider acting upon the recommendations 
presented in this thesis.  If the governments concerned pay careful attention to the issues 
surrounding the Court, this dispute need not have long term negative effects on 
European-American relations. 
Uncertainties remain about the future development of the Court, which may 
provide fruitful areas for further research.  Can the United States remain outside the ICC 
structure and still respect its operation while striving for the achievement of its noble 
goals by other means?  In theory the withdrawal of the American signature from the 
Rome Statute could be regarded as a declaration of intent not to cooperate with, or even 
to obstruct, the Court’s functioning, even if Americans are not involved, a course of 
action whose political consequences deserve careful consideration, since they would 
certainly exacerbate tensions that have been discussed in this thesis. 
Alternatively, will one side or the other be induced to change its position?  Will 
the exceptions and exemptions sought by the United States undermine the ICC or 
strengthen the resolve of the states party to the Rome Statute?  To what extent will the 
ICC be involved in the trial of former Iraqi leaders for their actions since July 2002?  
Furthermore, what role will the ICC play in prosecuting those accused of committing 
atrocities as the international campaign against terrorism progresses?  Finally, will the 
ICC survive its first trial or will the trial of a renowned international criminal prove too 
controversial or unwieldy?  These questions will likely be answered in coming years as 
the ICC carries out its work.  In the mean time, both the United States and the European 
Union must acknowledge their areas of disagreement and redouble their efforts to 
minimize long term damage to the transatlantic relationship. 
The controversy between the United States and the European Union over the 
International Criminal Court comes at a critical time in the development of this new legal 
institution and in an era of increasing threats to international security that put the 
mechanisms of international law at the forefront.  The United States and European Union 
countries view the Court differently, owing in part to their distinct historical development 
and unique positions in the international arena.  Though this controversy has generated 
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strong feelings on both sides, areas of common transatlantic cooperation and continuing 
efforts to promote international law via other means bode well for the future of European-
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